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VULTURES OR VANGUARDS?: THE ROLE OF LITIGATION
IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
Jill E. Fisch*
Caroline M. Gentile**
ABSTRACT
The market for sovereign debt differs from the market for corporate
debt in several important ways including the risk of opportunistic
default by sovereign debtors, the importance of political pressures,
and the presence of international development organizations.
Moreover, countries are subject to neither liquidation nor
standardized processes of debt reorganization. Instead, negotiations
between a sovereign debtor and its creditors lead to a voluntary
restructuring of the sovereign’s debt.
One of the greatest difficulties in restructuring claims against
sovereign debtors is balancing the interests of the majority of the
creditors with those of minority creditors. Holdout creditors serve as
a check on opportunistic defaults and unreasonable restructuring
terms, yet their presence can interfere with the restructuring process.
In this Article, we examine the role of holdout creditors within the
context of the international capital markets. In particular, we
consider the effect of a litigation remedy on the power of holdout
creditors to influence current restructurings of sovereign debt.
Recent commentators have criticized holdout creditors and proposed
mechanisms designed to reduce their power―particularly their
power to enforce contractual claims against sovereign debtors
through litigation. We argue that these proposals may undervalue the
role of holdout creditors in facilitating the restructuring process and
in promoting the functioning of the international capital markets.
Accordingly, we suggest that, prior to the implementation of broad
reforms, the value of holdouts be tested through a market-based
* Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law and Director, Center for Corporate, Securities & Financial Law,
Fordham University School of Law.
** Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. We presented earlier drafts of this Article at
the Conference on Sovereign Debt: The View from the Legal Academy, at Georgetown University Law
Center, and the Sloan Conference on Corporations, Markets, and the State, at George Washington University
Law School, and received many helpful comments.
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approach. We propose several modifications to the terms of
agreements governing sovereign bonds that can be tested in the
market as a mechanism for assessing the value of holdout litigation in
the international financial architecture.

* * *
INTRODUCTION
Recent financial crises in Latin America, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East
hve resulted in widespread restructurings of sovereign debt. The resolution of
these sovereign insolvencies differs from the resolution of corporate
insolvencies in several key ways. Most significantly, because countries are not
subject to liquidation or standardized processes of reorganization such as those
provided by bankruptcy law, the process involves a series of negotiations
between the sovereign debtor and its creditors to devise a voluntary
restructuring of the debt. Lacking both the threat of liquidation and regulatory
oversight, a sovereign debtor may choose to default on its obligations to its
creditors rather than to make the internal financial sacrifices that would enable
it to make the required payments on its debt. A default of this type, when the
sovereign debtor is unwilling, but not unable, to pay is often termed an
“opportunistic default.” Even in cases in which a sovereign debtor is truly
experiencing financial distress, the absence of a formal proceeding for
evaluating the debtor’s financial condition creates a risk of unreasonable
restructuring terms. Finally, because a restructuring plan need not adhere to
legislative standards or secure judicial review, it may discriminate against
minority creditors.
Political factors may also influence the restructuring process. For example,
by manipulating banking regulations, the governments of the countries in
which creditor banks are chartered may pressure those banks to provide
additional financing to strategically important sovereign debtors. At the same
time, international development organizations, including the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, can influence the restructuring
process by imposing conditions on the loans that they provide to resolve
temporary liquidity crises. These conditions typically include mandated
changes in macroeconomic policies and may include the privatization of stateowned entities.
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The challenge in restructuring sovereign debt is to manage these
complexities so as to engineer a voluntary process by which a sovereign debtor
and its creditors can negotiate a workable schedule of debt payments without
irreparably damaging market confidence. Extended restructuring processes
during which payments on existing debt are suspended, repayment terms that
appear to be unreasonably low, and unequal treatment of creditors, all threaten
not only the success of individual restructurings but also the long-term strength
of the international capital markets.
Given the voluntary nature of the restructuring process, creditors may
refuse to participate in a restructuring and instead “hold out” in the hope of
receiving better repayment terms or even the full value of their claims. These
recalcitrant creditors may seek payments from the sovereign debtor, or they
may seek to have their claims purchased by other creditors that are anxious to
complete the restructuring. In any event, holdout creditors are typically subject
to significant pressure to accede to the terms that are acceptable to a majority
of the creditors in the restructuring. They are also often subject to extensive
criticism. Holdout creditors have been charged with delaying the restructuring
process, thereby imposing unnecessary burdens on the citizens of the sovereign
debtors. They have also been denounced for seeking payments for themselves
at the expense of other creditors and at the risk of jeopardizing the
restructuring.
Over the course of the past several years, holdout creditors―particularly
vulture funds―have increasingly used litigation as a means of pursuing their
interests.1 Specifically, these creditors have filed lawsuits to enforce their
contractual claims against sovereign debtors.2 In some cases, the litigation has
been remarkably successful. The use of litigation has heightened concerns
regarding holdout creditors. Anne Krueger, the First Deputy Managing
Director of the IMF, observed that:

1 The term “vulture funds” generally refers to investment funds, particularly hedge funds and mutual
funds, that purchase the debt of countries, or companies, that are in financial distress. These funds thus
become creditors of the countries, or companies, through purchases of debt in the secondary market, rather
than as primary lenders.
2 Due to the financial distress of the country, vulture funds are typically able to purchase the country’s
debt at substantial discounts from its face value. Upon purchase of the debt, the vulture funds become entitled
to the full value of the claims—typically unpaid interest plus the principal amounts. Consequently, vulture
funds have strong incentives to hold out. For a discussion of the nature of the investments that vulture funds
make in distressed debt, and the incentives that they face, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein,
Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1214, 1233-40 (1991).
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the more recent success of an aggressive legal strategy employed
against Peru by a vulture company . . . underlines the power the
holdout creditors retain. The threat of disruption [of the restructuring
process] remains likely to deter countries from seeking a necessary
restructuring for longer than is desirable for either the country itself
or the international community.3

Concerns about holdout litigation have acquired new urgency in the wake
of Argentina’s current financial crisis. This crisis, which includes the largest
sovereign default in history, came to a head in December of 2001 when
Argentina defaulted on billions of dollars of outstanding bonds.4 Months later,
in September of 2003, Argentina proposed to restructure approximately $94
billion in public debt through a debt swap resulting in a seventy-five percent
reduction in the face value of the debt and forgiveness of past due interest.5
The proposal has been widely denounced by creditors, particularly vulture
funds,6 and it has spurred an unprecedented amount of litigation.7
The increasing prominence of holdout litigation has invigorated proposals
to limit the power of holdout creditors. Recent reform proposals include (1) a
3 Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, Address at the National Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner, American Enterprise
Institute (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Krueger, New Approach], at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2001/112601.htm. In a later speech, Dr. Krueger warned that “recent legal action against Peru shows
that holdouts can try to extract full payment from the sovereign [debtor] by threatening to interrupt payments
on the restructured debt, rather than by trying to seize assets. This possibility may make potentially more
cooperative creditors more reluctant to participate in a restructuring.” Anne Krueger, New Approaches to
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Address at the Conference on Sovereign Debt
Workouts: Hopes and Hazards?, Institute for International Economics (Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Krueger,
Update], at http://www.imf. org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm.
4 John Barham, Cooking Up a New Solution, LATINFINANCE, June 2003, at 10; see also Richard Lapper,
Argentina Plans Bonds Linked to Future GDP, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at 2 (discussing the financial crisis
in Argentina and the default on Argentina’s sovereign debt).
5 Argentina: Minister, Official Reveal More Details of Debt Proposal, BBC MONITORING INT’L REPS.,
Sept. 25, 2003; see Angela Pruitt, Argentine Bonds May Weaken More, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2003, at C15
(describing the proposed reduction in the face value of the debt).
6 Dennis Small, ‘Vulture Funds’ Descend on Dying Third World Economies, EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE
REV., Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2003/3039vultur_fnds.html.
7 See Joshua Goodman, Argentina President Berates Bondholders, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, at 2
(describing legal challenges to Argentina’s restructuring proposal); Angela Pruitt, U.S. Ruling a Setback for
Argentina, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2004, at B4 (describing judicial approval of “the first class action motion . . . in
a major sovereign debt restructuring” and explaining that Argentina is facing lawsuits from disgruntled
investors involving claims of more than $750 million); Jenny Wiggins, Hopes Remain for Negotiated
Settlement, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at 45 (describing negotiations regarding Argentina’s restructuring
proposal and noting that “[a]n increasing number of investors are filing lawsuits to try to recover the principal
and interest on their bonds, and the bondholders’ committee this week warned of ‘a flood of litigation by retail
and institutional bondholders globally’ if Argentina fails to reach some kind of consensual transaction”).
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market-based approach in which a sovereign debtor restructures its debt
through an exchange offer coupled with amendments to the terms of the debt
effected through exit consents, (2) a contract-based method involving the use
of collective action clauses (CACs) that permit the majority of the creditors to
amend the terms of the debt over the objections of minority creditors, and (3) a
regulatory-based mechanism in the form of an international bankruptcy
procedure, which is known as the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(SDRM). Despite the differences in approach, discussions of the merits of
these reforms have focused almost exclusively on their capacity to constrain
the ability of recalcitrant creditors to enforce their claims against sovereign
debtors by filing lawsuits.
This focus on curtailing holdout litigation, however, overlooks the benefits
that holdout creditors, particularly vulture funds, confer on the restructuring
process as well as the role that legal actions play in empowering creditors
relative to debtors and minority creditors relative to the majority of the
creditors. Holdout creditors, by refusing to participate in restructurings of
sovereign debt, serve as a check on opportunistic defaults and onerous
restructuring terms. Moreover, the prospect of holdout by minority creditors
may limit collusive behavior among the majority of the creditors. Holdout
creditors, particularly vulture funds, also promote the functioning of the
international capital markets. For example, by reducing the likelihood of
opportunistic defaults, holdout creditors increase capital flows to sovereign
debtors. Holdout creditors also provide value independent of the restructuring
process by increasing liquidity in the market for sovereign debt, especially
distressed debt. The extent to which holdout creditors provide those values in
these ways depends upon the power conferred through judicial enforcement of
their claims against sovereign debtors.
Yet, holdout litigation is not an unqualified good. In some cases, the
disruptive effects of holdout litigation outweigh its positive effects. We argue,
however, that critics of holdout litigation have not made the case for broad
reforms that would eliminate holdout litigation. Instead, the potential for
detrimental litigation can be reduced through more narrowly tailored
refinements to the litigation remedy implemented through market-based
changes in the terms of agreements governing sovereign bonds. The reaction
of the market to these changes offers a valuable opportunity to evaluate further
the role of holdout litigation.
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This Article proceeds in Part I by describing the salient features of the
restructuring process, beginning with the nature of sovereign default and then
turning to the historical developments leading to the use of litigation in
response to defaults. Part II reviews the development of litigation by holdout
creditors. Part III considers the primary proposals for limiting holdout
litigation, offers an evaluation of the role of holdout creditors and, based upon
this assessment, suggests modest alterations to the restructuring process.
Specifically, we emphasize the role holdout creditors may play in maintaining
the balance between the interests of majority creditors, and those of minority
creditors, while recognizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the
international capital markets. We suggest, therefore, modifications to the
agreements governing sovereign bonds, as a means of promoting the balance
between these interests and protecting the markets.
I. THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS
A. The Possibility of Opportunistic Default
Sovereign debt resembles commercial debt in many ways. From the
creditor’s perspective, in determining whether to make a loan to a particular
debtor, the creditor must assess the likelihood the debtor will default on the
loan and the likely recovery in the event of a default. The creditor is
constrained, however, in its ability to acquire full information about the debtor
and its financial condition. Additionally, the probability of default and the
amount of recovery upon default will vary with events that occur after the
making of the loan, including both events resulting from the debtor’s actions
and events that are beyond the debtor’s control.8
Sovereign debt, however, differs from commercial debt in important ways.
In the sovereign debt context, the creditor’s ability to assess the probability of
default and the probable recovery upon default is further hampered by the fact
that the sovereign debtor may default on the loan simply because it is unwilling
to make the required payments; that is, the debtor may default
opportunistically.9 A sovereign’s choice of macroeconomic policies is the
8

Professor Fischel designates the former “debtor misbehavior” and the latter “exogenous events.”
Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 134 (1989).
9 Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Bailins Versus Bailouts: Financial Crises in Emerging Markets,
Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Resolution and Alternative Approaches to Debt Restructuring, ch. 3, at 3
(Oct. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing difficulties in making loans to
sovereign borrowers).
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product of a variety of political factors that may, in some cases, outweigh
pressures for fiscal conservatism. Moreover, when a default occurs, the
creditor may be subject to pressure from regulators and the IMF regarding the
restructuring of the loan.
These factors will often interact with one another, complicating the
creditor’s analysis. For example, a sovereign debtor dependent upon export
taxes for revenues may experience difficulties in making payments on a loan
following declines in the prices of its exports. These difficulties may be
exacerbated by poor macroeconomic policies that result in stagnation.10 In this
situation, the sovereign debtor may, regardless of its ability to make payments
on the loan, opportunistically default on the loan.11 The default frees funds for
the debtor to use to ameliorate the effects of the shock in prices and the
misguided policies. Using the funds to alleviate discontent within the
sovereign debtor’s borders may be preferable to using the funds to make
payments on a loan owed to a foreign creditor.12 At the same time, because the
debtor is a government, with political and economic ties to other governments,
the default may cause those governments to impose political pressure on
creditors to make additional loans to the sovereign debtor.
The risk that a sovereign debtor may opportunistically default on a loan
aggravates the problem of “debtor moral hazard”13 in the context of sovereign
debt. Yet, creditors have few remedies when the sovereign debtor defaults on
10 Conversely, poor macroeconomic policies that result in stagnation may aggravate the risk that declines
in export prices result in difficulties in making payments on the loan.
11 As one commentator notes, determining a sovereign debtor’s “ability to repay is in the end not a very
difficult task. In all but the most extreme cases, [debtors] have the ability to repay their debts. . . . In the end,
willingness to repay is the key to sovereign [debtor] credit analysis.” Vincent Truglia et al., Sovereign Risk:
Bank Deposits vs. Bonds, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, GLOBAL CREDIT RES., Oct. 1995, at 4-5. Thus, an
opportunistic default refers to a default “driven by unwillingness to pay rather than inability to pay.” Nouriel
Roubini, Do We Need a New International Bankruptcy Regime? Comments on Bulow, Sachs and White 10
(Apr. 2002), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/bankreg.doc.
12 See, e.g., François P. Gianviti, Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: Basic Concepts and Issues, in
5 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 309, 312-13 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1998) (describing
negative consequences to citizens of measures taken to assure payment due on loans by sovereign debtors); see
also Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 5 (noting that “the real question is―what level of resource mobilization
are [sovereign debtors] willing to undertake to repay their debts?”).
13 Once a creditor makes a loan to a debtor, the creditor is subject to moral hazard on the part of the
debtor, as the creditor lacks the ability to control the debtor’s actions and, in most instances, the creditor also
lacks the ability to observe the debtor’s actions. For a general description of the problem of moral hazard, see
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 166-67, 195-96 (1992). In
the parlance of Professor Fischel, these conditions give rise to debtor misbehavior. Fischel, supra note 8, at
135-37. The problems engendered by the inability to control or to observe the debtor’s actions are exacerbated
when the creditor makes a loan to a sovereign debtor. Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, at 4.
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the loan. Creditors may not force a sovereign debtor into involuntary
bankruptcy, nor may they seek liquidation of the sovereign debtor’s assets in
satisfaction of the amounts due under the loan. Instead, the typical remedy for
sovereign default is a voluntary restructuring of the loan.14
If creditors cannot protect themselves from opportunistic defaults, access to
loans will be restricted and borrowing costs will be higher.15 Both creditors
and sovereign debtors, then, have interests in developing mechanisms for
limiting the possibility of opportunistic defaults.16 As a general matter, these
efforts, together with the other bargains between the creditors and the debtor,
are reflected in the terms of the agreement governing the loan.17 In particular,
a loan agreement provides creditors with the right to enforce claims against the
debtor under specified circumstances, and the agreement contemplates that
enforcement will involve filing suit in court. The specific elements of a typical
loan agreement that explicitly contemplate enforcement litigation include the
sovereign debtor’s waiver of sovereign immunity, choice-of-law provisions
through which the debtor submits to the laws and jurisdiction of a country with
a well-developed judicial structure, and provisions that specify the
requirements for the initiation of litigation. Litigation, then, may be seen as a
14 William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Best Interest of
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
15 See Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, ch. 3, at 4 (discussing the relationship between the risk of
opportunistic default and the availability of credit).
16 A costly restructuring process will also deter opportunistic defaults by raising the cost to debtors of
defaulting. See, e.g., William Cline, The Role of the Private Sector in Resolving Financial Crises in Emerging
Markets (Oct. 2000) (noting that international arrangements that convey the impression that default is painless
will tend to depress capital flows to governments of emerging market economies), available at
http://www.nber.org/~confer/2000/wisef00/cline.pdf; Michael Dooley & Sujata Verma, Rescue Packages and
Output Losses Following Crises (June 2001) (expressing concern that reforms that would make the
restructuring process more orderly, and so less costly, for sovereign debtors would result in fewer loans to the
governments of emerging market economies), available at http://econ.ucsc.edu/~mpd/dooleyverma.pdf. The
value of increasing the costs of the restructuring process is limited, of course, because a costly restructuring
process also hinders restructuring by sovereigns with truly unsustainable debt burdens. See Roubini, supra
note 11, at 10 (arguing that “subject to the caveat that defaults should not be too easy (to prevent opportunistic
defaults), an orderly debt restructuring should be the objective of an international regime that allows countries
with unsustainable debt profiles to restructure their liabilities”).
17 For a loan traded in the capital markets, the terms of the agreement, together with all of the other
factors affecting the loan―the difficulty in obtaining information regarding the financial policies and position
of the sovereign debtor, the likelihood of default and the likely recovery on default, the possibility of political
pressure, and the probability of involvement by the IMF―are reflected in the price of the loan. See RICHARD
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 347-51 (7th ed. 2003) (describing
the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which predicts that, for all securities traded in the capital markets, the
prices reflect available information); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565-88 (1984) (describing the role of trading in efficient capital markets).
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check on the possibility of opportunistic default, which in turn facilitates the
functioning of the international capital markets. Litigation may also operate as
a check on the terms of a proposed restructuring, giving a creditor recourse
against a restructuring that provides insufficient value to creditors or that
unduly favors some creditors over others.
B. The Sovereign Debt Market
Concerns regarding the likelihood of opportunistic defaults, and the best
means of ensuring the effectiveness of the restructuring process in limiting
these defaults, have long been part of the fabric of the sovereign debt market.
These concerns have been prudent. The history of sovereign lending,
particularly to the governments of the emerging market economies of Latin
America, reflects a series of crises―one in the 1930s, one in the 1980s, and the
current crisis. A review of the past crises provides a framework for analyzing
the role of holdout litigation today.18 In particular, a historical perspective
highlights the importance of developments in both the capital markets and the
courts to the emergence of holdout litigation.
1. The Crisis of the 1930s
Following World War I, foreign governments, particularly the governments
of Latin American countries, began to issue large amounts of bonds in New
York City.19 In the early 1920s, the principal issuers of sovereign bonds were
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba.20 Over the course of the decade, as the
bond market grew, banks established an extensive network of branches “that
successfully marketed the bonds to individual investors, eager for the large
premia they offered over domestic returns.”21 Between 1920 and 1929,

18 See, e.g., Deepak Lal, The Structure of International Capital Markets, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS,
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 61, 61 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eds., 2003) (describing a
historical perspective as essential); Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 6 (describing study of past sovereign
defaults as a useful tool in providing insights into possible future developments).
19 During the 1920s, the governments of Latin American countries issued over $2 billion in bonds in
New York City, accounting for approximately one quarter of the new capital issues floated in the United
States. Erika Jorgensen & Jeffrey Sachs, Default and Renegotiation of Latin American Foreign Bonds in the
Interwar Period, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 48, 51-52 (Barry
Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989). As a general matter, banks arranged loans that were then floated
as tradable securities in the market. Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 7.
20 Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 53.
21 Id. at 56.
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sovereign debtors in Latin America issued bonds totaling $2.1 billion in
value.22
With the beginning of the Great Depression, these sovereign debtors
experienced difficulty servicing their bonds.23 In December 1930, Bolivia
failed to meet sinking fund requirements on its bonds, and in January 1931, the
fiscal agent for the bonds declared Bolivia to be in default.24 This default was
soon followed by defaults on bonds issued by Peru and Chile.25 By 1933,
twelve Latin American debtors suspended at least part of their debt servicing,26
and by 1934, only Argentina, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had not
suspended normal debt servicing.27
In an effort to resolve the crisis, bondholders formed committees to
negotiate with sovereign debtors.28 Initially, in the United States, these
committees were ad hoc committees formed by bondholders to negotiate with
each sovereign debtor in default. These informal committees suffered from
high administrative expenses, lack of authority to speak for the bondholders,
and only limited contact with the federal government.29 In addition, a
proliferation of committees created competition in negotiations with sovereign
debtors.30 In response to these problems, and because many bondholders
22

JOHN T. MADDEN ET AL., AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE AS A CREDITOR NATION 77 (1937).
See Vinod K. Aggarwal, The Evolution of Debt Crises: Origins, Management and Policy Lessons, in
SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 18, at 11, 13 (noting that the depression “crushed the [debt] servicing prospects
of Latin American debtors”); Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 57 (stating that the combined effects of the
worldwide economic depression, protectionist measures in the United States and Europe, and the disruption of
the international capital markets devastated not only trade but also government revenues).
24 Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 58.
25 Id. at 58-61.
26 Aggarwal, supra note 23, at 13.
27 H. C. Wallich, The Future of Latin American Dollar Bonds, 33 AM. ECON. L. REV. 321 (1943).
28 Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 84
(1995) [hereinafter Macmillan, Debt Work-Out System]. Some bondholders pursued redress through the banks
that participated in the issuance of the bonds. The banks, however, lacked incentives to seek meaningful
compensation for the bondholders. They were the fiscal agents for the bonds, and they desired to maintain
favorable relationships with the sovereign debtors as a means of securing additional financing opportunities.
As a result, the claims of the bondholders remained unsatisfied. See, e.g., 5 SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, SEC
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF
PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 512-31 (1937) (critiquing the pursuit of claims through the
banks); Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 305, 338 (1995) [hereinafter
Macmillan, Debt Crisis] (describing the shortcomings of pursuing claims through the banks).
29 Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation and Readjustment During
the Interwar Years, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 19, at 12, 16.
30 Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors,
in CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 3, 21 (Barry Eichengreen & Richard
Portes eds., 1995).
23
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sought the assistance of the federal government in resolving their claims
against sovereign debtors, the Department of State, the Department of the
Treasury, and the Federal Trade Commission invited a group of prominent
citizens to meet with governmental officials to discuss the formation of an
unofficial council to assist bondholders.31 Several months later, on December
13, 1933, the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. (Council) was
incorporated as a nonprofit membership organization under the laws of
Maryland.32 The Council lacked the authority to bind bondholders to
restructuring plans; instead “it initiat[ed] negotiations with [sovereign debtors]
by virtue alone of its prestige as a semiofficial organization.”33 Upon
completing negotiations with sovereign debtors, the Council recommended
settlements to bondholders, which accepted or rejected the settlements.34
Further concessions from sovereign debtors were rare once the Council
recommended a settlement, because the Council ceased negotiations.35
The negotiations between bondholders, represented by the Council (or
another association), and a sovereign debtor in default on its bonds were quite
lengthy, taking years and even decades to complete. For example, the
negotiations regarding the bonds issued by Bolivia were not completed until a
31 See EDWIN BORCHARD, 1 STATE SOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 193-94 (1951) (describing
the initial plans for the formation of a council to represent bondholders); Michael R. Adamson, The Failure of
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 1934-1940, 76 BUS. HIST. REV. 479, 487 (2002)
(describing the role of the State Department in the formation of the council). Before action on the group’s
recommendation could be taken, Congress authorized the creation of a quasi-governmental agency to assist
bondholders. The effectiveness of the statute, however, was postponed “until the President found it in the
public interest. Since the President never so found, [the statute] never came into force.” BORCHARD, supra, at
194.
32 BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 196. The members of the Council were divided into three classes: full
members, who served as directors and were entitled to vote to recommend restructuring plans to bondholders;
contributing members, who were entitled to attend meetings of the Council but were not entitled to vote on
matters before the Council; and founders. The work of the Council was accomplished through an executive
committee and its officers. The executive committee members and officers, who were chosen for their
expertise in international law and finance, received salaries for their services. Financing for the Council was
initially provided by commercial banks. Upon successfully concluding settlement negotiations, the Council
solicited contributions from the sovereign debtors and the bondholders. The Council also received
contributions from the founders. See id. at 193-98 (describing the formation and operation of the Council).
Similar associations designed to serve the interests of bondholders existed in the United Kingdom and
France, as well as in other creditor countries. Most notably, in the case of the United Kingdom, the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, founded in 1868 and reorganized in 1898 by an act of Parliament,
became, by the 1930s, the universally acknowledged representative of British bondholders. Eichengreen &
Portes, supra note 29, at 15-16.
33 BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 198.
34 Id.
35 Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 70.
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settlement was reached in 1958.36 As a consequence of these protracted
negotiations, the market for sovereign bonds evaporated. In the years
following the crisis of the 1930s, the majority of loans to the governments of
emerging market economies in Latin America were made by public
institutions, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank, as well as by other countries, notably the United States.37
2. The Crisis of the 1980s
A fundamental shift in this pattern of lending and borrowing occurred in
the 1970s as international commercial banks located in the United States and
Western Europe became the principal source of loans to sovereign debtors in
Latin America. The oil crises of the decade, beginning with the dramatic
increase in oil prices in 1973,38 provided both the funds and the incentives for
the commercial banks to make the loans. Oil-exporting countries, unable to
spend on imports the revenues they received from their exports, deposited
surplus “petrodollars” with the banks. The banks, seeking high rates of return
on investments of the deposits, faced limited demand for loans among the
industrialized countries as economic recessions in those countries reduced the
need for capital. The governments of the emerging market economies in Latin
America, however, desired loans to finance their more costly imports of oil.
Consequently, the banks recycled the petrodollars into loans to these sovereign
debtors.39
In August 1982, Mexico declared that the country could no longer service
its debts to foreign creditors, especially commercial banks.40 In the ensuing
months, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela made similar

36 The negotiations regarding the bonds issued by Bolivia, the first country to default on its bonds in
1931, were not completed until a settlement was reached in 1958. Eichengreen & Portes, supra note 30, at 21.
Negotiations regarding the other twelve Latin American debtors to suspend at least part of their debt servicing
continued into the 1960s. Aggarwal, supra note 23, at 13.
37 Aggarwal, supra note 23, at 14; Eichengreen & Portes, supra note 30, at 22-23.
38 The price of crude oil, which was less than $3 per barrel at the end of 1973, rose to over $17 per barrel
by the end of 1979. LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY
154 (2003).
39 See id. (describing the impact of the oil crises on commercial banks); Stephen Bainbridge, Comity and
Sovereign Debt Litigation: A Bankruptcy Analogy, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 5-7 (1986) (discussing the
factors resulting in the recycling of petrodollars).
40 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 156.
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announcements.41 In subsequent years, many other sovereign debtors fell into
arrears on their debts, and several sovereign debtors suspended debt service
altogether.42
In working to restructure their debts, these sovereign debtors engaged in
negotiations with bank advisory committees regarding their commercial
loans.43 Typically, a sovereign debtor designated the commercial bank that
had extended it the largest loan to serve as the chair of a bank advisory
committee.44 The chair of the committee, in consultation with the sovereign
debtor, invited other commercial banks that had made loans to the debtor to
join the committee.45 The composition of the committee was important, as
members of the committee had to be able to reach a consensus among
themselves regarding a plan to restructure the commercial loans that was
acceptable to the sovereign debtor. The committee also had to be able to
convince the other commercial banks to support the plan.46 To facilitate these
efforts, committee members were chosen based on the geographic location of
the bank and the size of the loans made to the debtor.47 The members of each
bank advisory committee were generally large commercial banks located in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, France, and
Canada that had made large loans to the sovereign debtor.48
The official role of the bank advisory committees was to serve as conduits
of information between sovereign debtors and commercial banks.49 Bank
41 See Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for
Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2708 (1996) (describing defaults among sovereign debtors
in Latin America).
42 See Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 10 (stating that “[a]ll told, approximately [fifty] countries have
defaulted on their sovereign and commercial obligations since August 1982”); see also RIEFFEL, supra note 38,
at 154 (stating that the oil crisis of 1979, coupled with the recession of the early 1980s and a rise in borrowing
costs, hindered the ability of Latin American countries to service their debt).
43 The use of bank advisory committees began, and the process developed, with a series of five
negotiations taking place from 1976 to 1980 involving loans made to Zaire, Peru, Sudan, Turkey, and Poland.
See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 97, 295-316 (describing the evolution of bank advisory committees).
44 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 116.
45 Id.
46 See Charles Lipson, Bankers’ Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts, in
COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 200, 207 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) (describing the role of bank advisory
committees).
47 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 116. Typically, bank advisory committees consisted of between ten and
fifteen members. See James B. Hurlock, Advising Sovereign Clients on the Renegotiation of Their External
Indebtedness, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 29, 39 (1984) (describing the composition of bank advisory
committees).
48 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 217-18 (describing the composition of bank advisory committees).
49 See Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel to Agent Banks, Bank
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advisory committees described their function as serving as “communications
link[s]” between sovereign debtors and commercial banks.50 In practice,
however, bank advisory committees negotiated the terms of restructurings of
commercial loans with sovereign debtors. 51 Bank advisory committees lacked
formal authority to bind the commercial banks to restructuring plans.52 The
bank advisory committees instead advised the commercial banks of the terms
These informal
of the plans and then sought their ratification.53
arrangements―the use of bank advisory committees and the standard process
they followed in negotiating with sovereign debtors―are often referred to as
the “London Club” to differentiate them from the formal negotiations between
governments, known as the “Paris Club.”54
The bank advisory committees, in negotiating restructurings of sovereign
loans, adhered to a principle of treating all commercial banks equally.55 More
specifically, the committees sought to ensure the uniform treatment of all
commercial loans―like types of debt were to be treated alike56―and they also
Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 65-66 (1984) (describing the function
of bank advisory committees).
50 Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on InterCreditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 506.
51 Id.
52 The commercial banks did not designate the bank advisory committees as their representatives.
Moreover, upon the declaration of a moratorium on the servicing of obligations, including commercial loans,
the commercial banks retained the right to pursue legal remedies against the sovereign debtors. See id. at 504
(describing the consequences of a moratorium).
53 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 217-18 (describing the process by which bank advisory committees
operated).
54 See Daniel McGovern, Different Market Windows on Sovereign Debt: Private-Sector Credit from the
1980s to the Present, in SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 18, at 82-83 (describing characteristics of the London
Club).
55 Sovereign debtors also followed the principle of equal treatment of creditors. Buchheit & Reisner,
supra note 50, at 504-05. In announcing that a restructuring had commenced, a sovereign debtor included
assurances that all commercial banks would be treated equally. Id. Lee Buchheit and Ralph Reisner note:
These assurances have one objective—to engender moral responsibility among the various
creditors that will forestall more disgruntled banks from resorting to legal remedies. Partly for
this reason, telexes from [sovereign debtors] announcing the commencement of a generalized
debt restructuring are often accompanied by a communication from the largest commercial bank
lenders to the [debtor] confirming their willingness to forebear from exercising their legal rights
if the international banking community as a whole evidences a similar restraint.
Id. at 504.
56 Lipson, supra note 46, at 211. The restructuring process generally encompassed commercial loans,
while other types of debt were excluded from the process. Very short-term obligations such as suppliers’
credits and trade-related credits were generally not included within the restructuring process. Buchheit &
Reisner, supra note 50, at 515-16. Officially guaranteed loans were generally the subject of negotiations with
the creditor governments, working informally through the Paris Club. Lipson, supra note 46, at 212. Publicly

2004]

VULTURES OR VANGUARDS?

1061

sought uniformity in “the important areas of pricing, fees, tenor, amortization,
and legal documentation.”57 By following a basic principle of uniformity, the
bank advisory committees minimized the time period needed to complete the
negotiations with sovereign debtors.58 At the same time, “the emphasis on
uniformity also appeal[ed] to ‘simple-minded equity among banks,’ . . . and so
[made] it harder for individual banks to hold out for special treatment.”59
Although the members of the bank advisory committees and the other
commercial banks supported the principle of treating all banks equally, all of
the banks did not necessarily agree as to the most desirable treatment―that is,
although the banks promoted the notion of a uniform agreement, they did not
necessarily prefer the same terms. The principal reasons for disagreements
among the banks were differences in the sizes of the loans they had made
relative to their total assets, differences in the regulations to which they were
subject, differences in the nature of their business relationships with sovereign
debtors, and differences in their level of participation in the international
capital markets.
The large commercial banks located in the United States had made
enormous loans to sovereign debtors in Latin America―loans with an
aggregate value, in many instances, in excess of the total value of their assets.60
These banks faced a very serious threat of insolvency. They also confronted a
difficult regulatory environment. For banks in the United States, applicable
regulations required that a loan be declared “nonperforming” in the event
interest accrued on the loan was not paid within ninety days after its due date.61
Regulations also required that all banks set aside adequate reserves for
issued bonds were “good candidates for exemption from a restructuring,” Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50,
at 515, “because they [were] widely disbursed, and because each holder [had] legal rights to petition for
default if payments [were] not made as scheduled.” Lipson, supra note 46, at 212.
57 Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 505. Mr. Buchheit and Professor Reisner also note that
“[d]eparting from this practice risk[ed] arousing the latent suspicion of the [commercial banks] that some
banks will be favored over others, thereby jeopardizing the success of the entire restructuring program.” Id.
58 Charles Lipson describes the norm of uniformity as having “‘the great advantage of speeding
negotiations’. . . [that] not only minimizes negotiating time in the first rescheduling . . . but [also] makes
subsequent [reschedulings] much easier.” Lipson, supra note 46, at 211. By creating a clear standard, it also
“eases negotiations with other [sovereign debtors].” Id.
59 Id. at 212.
60 See Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 312 n.38 (noting that the loan exposure in respect of the
five largest sovereign debtors in Latin America, as a percentage of shareholders’ equity, was 254.7% for
Manufacturers Hanover, 198.3% for Chase Manhattan, 179.6% for Chemical Bank, 178.6% for CitiCorp,
166.8% for Bankers’ Trust, 145.1% for Bank America, and 134.5% for Morgan Guaranty) (citing ANATOLE
KALETSKY, THE COSTS OF DEFAULT 112 tbl.6.3 (1985)).
61 See Power, supra note 41, at 2710 (describing applicable regulations).
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nonperforming loans, called “loan-loss reserves.”62 Since the total value of the
loans made by large commercial banks in the United States exceeded the total
value of their assets, the banks could not create adequate loan-loss reserves.
To prevent the insolvency of the largest commercial banks in the United
States, the bank advisory committees worked diligently to avoid defaults.63
Specifically, the committees devised a general plan for the restructurings in
which sovereign debtors continued to pay interest on loans as it came due.64
This approach, however, required commercial banks to make additional loans
to sovereign debtors because the debtors lacked sufficient foreign currency
reserves to pay the interest on their troubled loans. The new loans provided the
sovereign debtors with the cash needed to make interest payments on their
existing loans in a timely manner.
Consistent with the principle of treating all commercial banks equally, the
new loans were to be made by the commercial banks ratably based upon the
value of the loans previously made to the various sovereign debtors. Each
commercial bank having made loans to a sovereign debtor “as of a specified
date [was] asked to participate in [the] new money loans in an amount that
[was] proportional to the bank’s aggregate credit exposure in the country on
that date.”65
Large commercial banks located in the United States readily supported the
approach, including the new loans, as it provided a means for these banks to
avoid insolvency.66 These banks had two additional reasons for supporting the
approach. First, the banks had business relationships with the sovereign
debtors, and they were eager to broaden those relationships. For example,
these banks arranged loans for sovereign debtors, and they held deposits for
both governmental agencies and local businesses.67 These services, however,
62

Id.
Alexander Nicoll, Latin American Debt Crisis: Solution Passes the Test of Time, FIN. TIMES, July 30,
1992, at 4 (describing the essence of the strategy as one to “buy time: stretch out the problem so that
[sovereign] debtors could introduce economic changes necessary to restore creditworthiness, and allow
[commercial banks] to build up their capital sufficiently to absorb the shocks”).
64 The plan also included rescheduling of the principal amounts of the loans. See Power, supra note 41,
at 2709 (describing the restructuring process).
65 Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 508.
66 See Lee C. Buchheit, Alternative Techniques to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
371, 385 (noting that “[b]etween the two evils of making an involuntary loan to a less-than-creditworthy
borrower, or allowing existing loan assets to slip into the ‘non-performing’ category, most banks tend[ed] to
prefer the former”).
67 Lipson, supra note 46, at 210.
63
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were only the starting point for the businesses the banks hoped to develop; the
banks were also interested in providing short-term credit for private-sector
importers and exporters and in opening branches in emerging market
economies.68 Second, these banks were permanent participants in the
international capital markets, and they expected to continue working with other
large commercial banks in a variety of settings. The members of the bank
advisory committees “viewed debt restructuring as a regrettable but normal
business activity,”69 and so they expected to participate with one another as
repeat players in restructurings. In addition, these banks participated together
in many loan syndications,70 and they were linked to one another through the
financial network comprising the international capital markets.71
Other commercial banks located in the United States, smaller banks with
small portfolios of loans to sovereign debtors, were less inclined to support the
restructuring plans negotiated by the bank advisory committees. For these
banks, the total value of their loans to sovereign debtors was small relative to
the total value of their assets. Thus, these “smaller banks ha[d] no impending
‘nightmare scenario.’”72 Declaring the loans to be nonperforming loans would
not have threatened the solvency of these banks because they had adequate
loan-loss reserves. In addition, the smaller banks did not have business
relationships with sovereign debtors, and they were not regular participants in
the international capital markets. Accordingly, these banks were not
concerned about jeopardizing the development of future international
business.73
The smaller commercial banks were particularly opposed to making new
loans to troubled sovereign debtors, a practice they viewed as “throwing good
68 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 106-07. In fact, Lex Rieffel characterizes the “desire to continue doing
business” with sovereign debtors as the “driving motivation for most banks represented on [bank advisory
committees].” Id. at 111.
69 Id.
70 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 210-11 (describing the relationships among commercial banks). In a
syndicated loan, a group of commercial banks join together to advance funds to a particular debtor under one
loan agreement. See Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 500 (describing nature of loan syndication
process); see also Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 323 n.95 (describing the nature of syndicated
loans).
71 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 210-11 (describing the relationships among commercial banks).
72 Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 324.
73 Lipson, supra note 46, at 214 (describing the role of smaller commercial banks). These banks did,
though, have an effective means of recourse against sovereign debtors. For some of these banks, loans were so
small that the assets of the debtors located in the United States, and subject to attachment, were sufficient to
satisfy any judgments they may have won. See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 18 (describing the availability of
litigation remedies to smaller commercial banks).
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money after bad.”74 In addition, these banks recognized that the larger
commercial banks were facing threats of insolvency. The smaller banks, thus,
viewed the larger banks as having strong incentives not only to make new
loans as specified in the restructuring plans but also to commit additional funds
to cover any shortfalls in the values of the total loan packages arising from the
refusal of the smaller banks to make new loans.75
The bank advisory committees viewed the opposition of the smaller
commercial banks, particularly the resistance to making new loans to sovereign
debtors, as a threat both to the principle of treating all commercial banks
equally and to the success of the restructuring plans. Because the committees
could not bind these banks to the terms of the agreements reached with
sovereign debtors, they sought the voluntary cooperation of the smaller banks.
Each member of the bank advisory committee bore responsibility for securing
the cooperation of a specific group of smaller commercial banks, typically
determined by geographic location.76 The principal focus of each large
commercial bank in securing the cooperation of the smaller commercial banks
located in its region was the immediate banking relationships on which each
smaller bank relied.77 For example, officials of the large bank would warn
their counterparts at a smaller bank that failure to cooperate might create
74 Power, supra note 41, at 2711. The sovereign debtors, after all, were “self-declared insolvent
debtors.” Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 324; see also Nancy P. Gibbs, A Regional Bank’s
Perspective: An Analysis of the Differences and Similarities in the U.S. Banking Community’s Approach to
and Participation in the Mexican Restructuring, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 11, 18 (1984) (noting that, in
the restructuring of the loans made to Mexico, “the banks with very small exposures were reluctant to increase
their exposure by a penny even if it meant writing off their existing [loan] portfolios”).
75 WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE 75 (1984); see also
Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 324 (describing this situation as “the ‘free-rider’ problem in interbank relations”); Robert K. MacCallum, Note, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Rights and Duties of
Commercial Banks Inter Sese, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 425, 435 (noting that the smaller banks, many of
whom acquired portfolios of loans to sovereign debtors through participations in syndicated loans at the
invitation of the large commercial banks, argued that the large banks should bear the burden of making new
loans).
76 The large commercial banks generally recognized that service as a member of a bank advisory
committee included working to secure the cooperation of the smaller commercial banks. Lipson, supra note
46, at 215-18.
77 These banking relationships were vital to the businesses of the smaller commercial banks, as they
provided access both to participations in syndicated loans and to banking services. These relationships were
also tremendously important in the context of loans to sovereign debtors, including restructurings of those
loans, because the smaller banks generally lacked access to information regarding the financial positions of the
debtors and, in restructurings, the repayment intentions of the debtors. For a description of the banking
relationships on which the smaller banks relied, see id. at 220. For a description of the difficulties of the
smaller commercial banks in gaining access to information regarding sovereign debtors, see Power, supra note
41, at 2712.
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difficulties for the smaller bank in purchasing participations in new syndicated
loans, including loans to domestic borrowers.78
This pressure was often sufficient to cause reluctant smaller banks to ratify
the agreements with the sovereign debtors and to support the proposed
restructuring plans.79 In the event that it was not, federal banking regulators
could exert additional pressure.80 In particular, the International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983 granted regulators significant powers to require banks
to set aside higher reserves against loans to sovereign debtors experiencing a
“protracted inability . . . to make payments on their external indebtedness.”81
The statute gave regulators broad discretion to determine whether or not a bank
was required to maintain greater reserves, enabling regulators to pressure
reluctant banks to support restructurings.82
Finally, the IMF also exerted pressure, albeit indirectly, on dissenting
smaller banks. In 1982, the IMF initiated the practice of conditioning its loans
to any troubled sovereign debtor on a commitment from all the commercial
banks that had made loans to the debtor to make new loans.83 At the same
time, the IMF continued its policy of requiring each sovereign debtor to
implement austerity programs, monitored by the IMF, as a condition of
receiving IMF loans.84 The commercial banks, in turn, required each debtor to
adopt the austerity program proposed by the IMF and to submit to monitoring

78 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 220 (describing the tactics used by large commercial banks in pressuring
smaller commercial banks to support restructuring plans negotiated by bank advisory committees).
79 “The whole point [was] to break down the large . . . game, involving hundreds of banks and
considerable opportunities for free-riding, into a series of bilateral games pitting a few small holdouts against
the major money-center banks.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
80 These regulators included the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Keith A. Palzer, Comment,
Relational Contract Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 727, 742 n.82 (1988).
81 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(1)(A) (2000). See generally Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The U.S. Response to the
International Debt Crisis: The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 401 (1985)
(describing the International Lending Supervision Act).
82 Power, supra note 41, at 2713; see also Palzer, supra note 80, at 745 n.97 (noting that regulators used
their authority “to impose a minimum level of reserves on banks which refuse[d] to follow the market”).
83 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 223 (describing the role of the IMF in pressuring smaller banks to
support restructuring plans negotiated by bank advisory committees); see also Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra
note 28, at 319 n.76 (noting that, “[i]n the case of Mexico, the IMF refused to give financial assistance until all
1400 of Mexico’s commercial bank creditors had agreed to extend additional loans of $5 billion new money,
which amounted to seven percent of their existing loan exposure”).
84 The austerity programs typically involved efforts to balance current accounts by restricting imports,
devaluing local currency, and balancing domestic budgets. See Bill Orr, After a Decade Bankers Say “Adios”
to Latin Debt Crisis, A.B.A. BANKING J., July 1992, at 36.
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by the IMF as a condition to receiving new loans.85 This structure of
interrelated conditions among the IMF and the commercial banks served as a
means of exerting pressure on smaller banks.86
Commercial banks located outside the United States also were not inclined
to support the restructuring plans negotiated by the bank advisory committees.
As a general matter, commercial banks located in Western Europe had made
relatively small loans to sovereign debtors in Latin America, particularly as
compared to the total value of their assets. Thus, the exposure to the crisis in
the sovereign debt market was significantly lower for the Western European
banks than the exposure of the large U.S. banks.87 In addition, the regulatory
environment was, in important ways, more favorable in Western Europe than
in the United States. Banks in Western Europe were not required to degrade
the value of a loan in the event that accrued interest was not paid within ninety
days after its due date.88 The banks in Western Europe, as a result, preferred to
capitalize accrued but unpaid interest rather than to make new loans to
sovereign debtors. The tension was resolved in favor of the U.S. banks simply
because they were able to commit credibly to supporting only restructuring
plans that provided for new loans to sovereign debtors. The Western European
banks, on the other hand, could not credibly refuse to support these
restructuring plans because, although they were not the most preferred plans,
they would not result in tremendous losses to the banks.
The large commercial banks in the United States also appealed to the
interests of the Western European banks by urging them to support the plans as
a means of enhancing their relationships with sovereign debtors and their roles
in the international capital markets.89 Once the large commercial banks in
Western Europe agreed to the restructuring plans, they used their relationships
with smaller commercial banks to pressure the smaller banks to ratify the
85 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 211 (noting that “[t]he difficult issue of the [sovereign] debtor’s future
policies [was] removed from these negotiations [regarding the restructuring of the loans made by commercial
banks]” and that “[t]he [commercial banks] simply insist[ed] on I.M.F. conditional lending and economic
supervision”).
86 See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 54, at 74 (describing this system of “concerted lending” as
“essentially a gentleman’s agreement: where (a) banks made new loans to troubled sovereigns; (b) the
sovereigns adopted sound economic policies; (c) multinational institutions provided new adjustment lending;
and (d) the sovereigns remained current on payments to creditors”).
87 See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 46, at 210-13 (describing the greater vulnerability of U.S. commercial
banks as compared to Western European commercial banks).
88 Id. at 212.
89 Id. at 209-14 (discussing the strategy of the U.S. banks in convincing the Western European banks to
support restructuring plans that included new loans to troubled sovereign debtors).
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agreements and to support the plans.90
Using the various forms of pressure available to them, the commercial
banks concluded forty-two debt restructurings with the governments of thirtytwo countries during the period from 1982 to 1984.91 Some of the
restructurings were completed within a few months, while other restructurings
took several years to complete.92
These restructurings, however, were followed by more restructurings. The
restructuring of Mexico’s debt was regarded as a model for other
restructurings, yet three years later, in 1986, Mexico was unable to service the
obligations on the loans that had been previously rescheduled. As a result,
Mexico entered into a new series of negotiations that resulted in rescheduling
loans in excess of $97 billion.93 Between 1983 and 1990, Mexico restructured
its debts to foreign creditors twelve times, and many countries in Latin
America restructured their foreign debts many times.94
The repeated restructurings caused strains among the participating
commercial banks. As Lee Buchheit notes:
The first round of debt rescheduling for a particular country may
have enjoyed unanimous participation, but the second, third and
fourth round did not. Within two years of the first rescheduling,
fissures appeared in the cohesion of the banking community: big
banks versus little banks; regional banks versus money centre banks;
banks in North America versus banks in Europe, Japan and the Gulf;
banks with large loan loss reserve provisions versus banks without
such provisions.95
90 Once the large commercial banks in Western Europe agreed to support the restructuring plans, they
had strong incentives to induce the smaller commercial banks in their regions to support the plans, because the
support of the smaller banks would reduce the size of the new loans the large banks would be required to
make.
91 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 159.
92 Id. Although the restructuring of the debt Mexico owed to foreign creditors was completed within one
year, in the case of Argentina almost three years were required to conclude the restructuring process. Id.
93 See Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 333 (describing the restructuring of Mexican debt).
94 See Martin Wolf, On Sovereign Bankruptcies—Economic Eye, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 22
(discussing repeated restructurings and noting that eleven countries, including Mexico, restructured their debts
ten or more times between 1980 and 1994).
95 Lee C. Buchheit, Majority Action Clauses May Help Resolve Debt Crises, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug.
1998, at 13. The bank advisory committees worked to minimize these strains. For example, commercial
banks were occasionally granted permission to allocate their new loans to debtors of their choice within the
country. In this way, the banks were permitted to maintain relationships with existing clients. In addition, the
restructuring plans provided a cushion in the event smaller banks refused to make new loans. These plans
provided for a total amount of new loans slightly greater than the amount needed to reschedule the loans.
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Notably, these strains did not result in significant litigation.96 As a general
matter, the commercial banks “weighed the low odds of recovering more
money against the costs of litigation, taking into account their varying tax and
regulatory regimes,” and they apparently concluded that “[t]he attractions of
negotiated solutions were . . . far superior to the attractions of litigation.”97
The strains within the banking community led, instead, to the development
of a secondary market for loans made to sovereign debtors. Indeed, shortly
after the first round of debt reschedulings, commercial banks began to develop
a small market for sovereign loans that consisted of interbank swaps.98 As the
debt crisis deepened, many commercial banks became eager to sell, in the
secondary market, the loans they had made to sovereign debtors.99 By selling
Thus, if all the commercial banks were to make new loans as required by the plans, a small amount of excess
financing would be provided. See Lipson, supra note 46, at 219 (describing these efforts). Under this
approach, an agreement negotiated with a sovereign debtor was considered to be ratified, and the restructuring
plan was considered to be approved, upon the acceptance of a “critical mass” of commercial banks, usually
representing more than 95% (but less than 100%) of the total value of the loans made to a sovereign debtor.
RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 122.
The bank advisory committees did not, though, purchase the loans made by the dissenting banks. As
Professor Lipson reports the views of a syndications manager in London, “no banks have been bought out of a
rescheduling. ‘If we did that . . . that would be the end. [The rescheduling] would unravel like a cheap
sweater’ as other smaller [banks] stood in line for the same deal.” Lipson, supra note 46, at 219 (footnote
omitted).
96 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 3 (noting that the debt crisis of the 1980s “produced
remarkably little litigation”); Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York & Clifford Chance, London,
Avoiding the Nightmare Scenario, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1992, at 19 (stating that “[w]hen one considers that
the debt crisis has offered more than U.S. $500 [billion] of provocation to potential plaintiffs, the number of
lawsuits actually filed . . . over the last decade has been astonishingly small”).
97 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 159 n.17. Although any commercial bank, upon an event of default, had the
right to accelerate the loan and to sue for the entire unpaid balance of the loan, the banks recognized that the
likelihood of recovering amounts owed by sovereign debtors was very small. The difficulties associated with
attaching the assets of sovereign debtors are discussed infra in Part II.
In addition, the terms of the syndicated loan agreements pursuant to which many of the loans were made
limited the actions of the banks in the syndicate by requiring a majority vote, or a supermajority vote, to
declare an event of default. Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 496. The syndicated loan agreements also
contained sharing clauses and cross-default clauses, both of which limited the recovery that any bank might
receive through litigation. See, e.g., id. at 502 (describing sharing clauses); id. at 496 (describing cross-default
clauses).
98 See Michael M. Chamberlin & Thomas E. Winslade, Regulating the LDC Debt Markets, INT’L FIN. L.
REV., Aug. 1992, at 16 (describing the development of the market for interbank swaps). The swaps were
generally accomplished through assignments, and the assignment agreements typically provided that the
assignee bank assumed, in addition to the right to payments on the loans, the responsibility for participating in
future restructurings of the loans, including the making of new loans based upon the exposure level
represented by the assigned loans. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Evolution of Debt Restructuring Techniques,
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1992, at 10 (describing the mechanics of the secondary market).
99 See Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 328 (noting the means by which commercial banks
exited the sovereign debt market).
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its loans, a bank was able to reduce its proportion of the total loans made to
that debtor, thereby reducing the amount of new loans the bank would be
required to make in future restructurings of the loans.100
The debt crisis continued, fueled in part by continuing weaknesses in the
emerging market economies of Latin America.101 At the same time, the total
value of new loans made to the governments of these countries by commercial
banks declined drastically, exacerbating the problems these countries faced.102
To alleviate the continuing crisis, not only commercial banks but also the U.S.
government sought ways to improve both the restructuring process and the
outcomes of the restructurings.
The commercial banks, operating through the bank advisory committees,
introduced multiyear rescheduling agreements. These agreements were
designed to reduce the time and expense of annual restructurings and to form a
basis for commercial banks to exit the sovereign debt market.103 In October of
1985, Treasury Secretary James Baker announced a new plan for resolving the
debt crisis entitled “Program for Sustained Economic Growth” (Baker Plan).104
The purpose of the Baker Plan was to provide additional loans to sovereign
debtors, from both official sources and private sources, subject to the
commitment of each recipient to implement specified programs deemed
important for achieving long-term growth.105 Several restructurings were

100 For sovereign debtors, the sales also provided a mechanism for eliminating the objections of dissenting
commercial banks.
101 See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS REPORT IN LATIN
AMERICA: 1990 REPORT 15 (1990) (describing the difficulties confronting these countries).
102 Id. Although bankers often attributed their refusal to make new loans to poor macroeconomic policies
on the part of these governments, at least one commentator has suggested that the decline in new loans was
due, in part, to the recalcitrance of smaller commercial banks in refusing to support restructuring plans that
provided for new loans to sovereign debtors. See Paul Krugman, Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors,
in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 299, 307-17 (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989)
(describing the trends in lending during the period from 1982 to 1986).
103 As a general matter, the agreements consolidated payments falling due over several years, lengthened
repayment periods to as long as twenty years, reduced the interest on both rescheduled loans and new loans,
and eliminated the restructuring fee that was imposed in earlier restructurings. In addition, some of the
agreements contained debt-equity conversion clauses, on-lending, and trade-facility options for new-money
commitments. Mexico negotiated the first multiyear rescheduling agreement in 1984; the agreement covered
principal payments over six years, from 1984 to 1989. In addition, Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Jamaica, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia also negotiated multiyear rescheduling agreements.
See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 162-63 (describing experiences with multiyear rescheduling agreements).
104 Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt: The United States Reconsiders, 64 FOREIGN AFF.
259, 267, 273 (1985).
105 See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 163 (describing the Baker Plan).
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completed under the Baker Plan.106
During 1987, however, “the Baker Plan was effectively abandoned as
[commercial] banks began to experiment with a variety of debt-restructuring
techniques that included elements of debt reduction.”107 Significantly, in April
of 1987, Citibank, N.A. announced that it would record a loss of $2.5 billion in
order to increase its loan-loss reserves from $2 billion to $5 billion, an amount
equal to twenty-five percent of the bank’s exposure to loans made to sovereign
debtors in the emerging market economies.108 Other large commercial banks
in the United States soon made similar adjustments, and a second round of
adjustments was announced later in the year.109 These decreases in loan
exposure eliminated the threat of insolvency for the U.S. banks.110 Similarly,
in 1988, commercial banks located in Western Europe and Japan increased
their provisions for loans made to sovereign debtors in emerging market
economies thereby reducing their exposure.111 Through these changes,
commercial banks dramatically reduced the losses they would incur upon a
reduction in the total value of the loans made to sovereign debtors.112
On March 10, 1989, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady articulated a series
of new principles for resolving debt crises, which became known as the “Brady

106 The countries completing restructurings of their debt under the Baker Plan include Mexico in March of
1987, Argentina in August of 1987, and Brazil in November of 1988. Id at 164.
107 Id.
108 See id. at 165 (describing changes in provisionings for loans to sovereign debtors in Latin America);
Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 327 (same).
109 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 165.
110 In 1982, the exposure of the nine largest commercial banks located in the United States to developingcountry debt was over 250% of their capital. By 1986, the exposure had been reduced to 167.2%, and with
respect to only sovereign debtors in Latin America, the exposure was 97.7%. Stanley Fischer, Sharing the
Burden of the International Debt Crisis, 99 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 165, 166-67 (1987). In addition,
from 1985 to 1988, U.S. commercial banks reduced their exposure to loans made to sovereign debtors in Latin
America by 30%, and they lowered the ratio of the value of these loans to the total value of their assets from
245% in 1981 to less than 100% in 1989. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 101, at 14. In
1989, reserves represented 30% of the value of loans to these sovereign debtors. Id. The result, of course, was
to weaken an important force for cohesiveness among the commercial banks that had made loans to sovereign
debtors.
111 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 165.
112 These changes also had an immediate impact on the secondary market for sovereign loans.
Specifically, the reductions in the values of the loans recorded on the balance sheets of the banks resulted in
large declines in the prices of the loans in the secondary market. See id. at 167 (presenting data regarding
prices for sovereign loans in the secondary market). The decreases in the prices of the sovereign loans in the
secondary market, in turn, provided additional trading opportunities and so further eroded the incentives for
cooperation among commercial banks.
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Plan.”113 These principles included a reduction in the total amount of debt
owed by sovereign debtors in exchange for both a commitment on the part of
the debtors to adopt specified reforms designed to achieve sustainable growth,
notably the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and greater assurances of
the collectability of the debt. In addition, these principles included the use of
different forms of debt to increase liquidity in the international capital markets.
Finally, the principles included complementary support from a variety of
official sources, including the rescheduling of loans owed to official creditors
and new loans from bilateral aid agencies and export credit agencies.114
To implement these policies, the loans the commercial banks made to each
sovereign debtor participating in the Brady Plan were securitized. The loans
were pooled together, and then they were exchanged for Brady Bonds. The
bonds were sold publicly to investors. The proceeds from the sale of the bonds
were used to repay the loans. As a result of these transactions, the commercial
banks exited the sovereign debt market, and they were replaced by investors
holding Brady Bonds.115
113 See Nicholas F. Brady, Remarks to the Brookings Institute and Bretton Woods Committee Conference
on Third World Debt (Mar. 10, 1989), in BROOKINGS DIALOGUES ON PUBLIC POLICY, THIRD WORLD DEBT:
THE NEXT PHASE 69 (Edward R. Fried & Philip H. Trezise eds., 1989) (outlining principles for resolving debt
crises).
114 See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 170-74 (describing the Brady Plan). In connection with the Brady Plan,
the IMF altered its policies regarding loans to sovereign debtors in times of crisis. Specifically, the IMF began
providing loans to sovereign debtors so long as they were implementing a credible adjustment program and
negotiating in good faith with the commercial banks that had made loans to them (even though the negotiations
were not complete), and it abandoned the policy of requiring sovereign debtors to eliminate arrears before it
would disperse new loans. Id.
115 To reduce the total amount of debt owed by the sovereign debtor, the bonds were issued at a discount,
in terms of either principal or interest, from the loans with which they were exchanged. In a typical
restructuring under the Brady Plan, the bank advisory committee negotiated with the sovereign debtor to
provide a menu of options, each of which was carefully tailored “to fit the varying regulatory and tax regimes
of the banks involved, while remaining financially equivalent.” Id. at 172. The two most common options
were par bonds, which were exchanged for the same principal amount of the loans but bearing a fixed interest
rate below the prevailing rate in the market, and discount bonds, exchanged at a substantial discount from the
principal amount of the loans but bearing an interest rate based on the market rate. In addition to these two
options, debt-equity swaps, which resulted in the banks holding a claim in the local currency that could be
exchanged for shares of an entity subject to privatization, and cash repurchases of the loans, at substantial
discounts from the principal amount of the loans, were also available. The bonds usually had a maturity of
thirty years, which was substantially longer than the maturity of the loans. Id.
The collectability of the bonds was enhanced through assistance provided by multilateral (and bilateral)
agencies. The most common form of enhancement related to the principal amount of the bonds. Typically, a
sovereign debtor purchased, with a combination of credit from the IMF and loans from the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as with its own reserves, thirty-year, zero-coupon Treasury
bonds. The Treasury bonds served to collateralize the bonds by ensuring full payment upon maturity. The
collateral for the principal of the bonds, however, was not available to the bondholders until the maturity of the
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Although regulators initially viewed Brady Bonds as “appropriate only for
a limited audience of speculative investors,” the high rates of return provided
by the bonds attracted many investors.116 As the market for sovereign bonds
grew,117 the governments of emerging market economies, particularly in Latin
America, realized that they could access the bond markets for a significant
portion of their financing needs and implemented strategies to do so.118
One of the most important advantages of bonds is their flexibility as
compared to loans from commercial banks. Bonds have longer maturities than
commercial loans, and the covenants in the agreements governing the bonds
are generally less restrictive than the covenants contained in the agreements
governing commercial loans. In addition, bonds are easily listed and traded on
the stock exchanges, and they have relatively simple clearing and settlement
procedures. Finally, the rating agencies assign credit ratings to sovereign
bonds, providing investors with intercountry comparisons of the risks
associated with the bonds. This information, in turn, facilitates daily market
pricing and trading, both of which serve to increase the attractiveness of
sovereign bonds to investors. As a result, during the 1990s, bonds issued to
investors in the capital markets replaced loans from commercial banks as the

loans. A second common form of enhancement related to the interest accruing on the bonds. As in the case of
the collateral for the principal amount of the bonds, Treasury securities were pledged to ensure that the interest
on the bonds was paid. Typically, this collateral was limited to the interest accruing on the bonds over a
period of eighteen months (or perhaps two years), and the collateral was not available to bondholders for a
period of eighteen months following a default on the bonds. Finally, the bonds also contained covenants
pursuant to which the sovereign debtors promised to refrain from requesting restructurings of the bonds. Any
request to restructure the bonds would thus constitute an event of default. See id. (describing the menu of
options offered under the Brady Plan); Power, supra note 41, at 2721-22 (describing the characteristics of the
Brady Bonds).
116 McGovern, supra note 54, at 75. In this way, the investors were similar to the purchasers of sovereign
bonds in the 1920s.
Many investors also tended to underestimate the risk of default on the bonds. In miscalculating this
risk, investors relied on a variety of factors, including the absence of defaults on sovereign bonds during the
period from the early 1940s to the early 1990s and the exclusion of sovereign bonds from the restructurings of
the 1980s. See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 192-94 (describing the historical experience with sovereign bond
defaults). But see Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 10 (describing six defaults on marketable security debt,
including bonds, between 1982 and 1990).
117 According to some estimates, between 1988 and 1995, twenty-one countries restructured their debt
under the Brady Plan. These restructurings involved a total of $170.2 billion of debt, and resulted in a
reduction in total debt service costs of $76 million, reflecting an average of approximately 45% of the total.
Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW. 103, 106 (2003).
118 Initially, countries exchanged their Brady Bonds for Eurobonds, in both public exchanges and private
exchanges. Over time, countries issued Eurobonds to serve a variety of financing needs. See Jane Brauer &
Ryan McDuffy, The Decline of Brady Debt, MERRILL LYNCH EMERGING MARKETS RES., Apr. 5, 2004, at 1, 2.
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main form of private capital flows to emerging market economies.119
3. The Current Crisis
By 1994, financial crises in several countries led to new crises involving
sovereign debt.120 Many of these crises involved restructurings of sovereign
bonds. For example, in 1999 Pakistan restructured three Eurobonds with a
face value of approximately $600 million; in 2000 Ecuador restructured Brady
Bonds and Eurobonds with an aggregate face value of approximately $6.5
billion and the Ukraine restructured four Eurobonds with a face value of
approximately $2.3 billion; and in 2003 Uruguay restructured international
bonds with a total face value of approximately $5.45 billion.121 And, of
course, in 2001, Argentina defaulted on billions of dollars of bonds.122
The recent restructurings of sovereign bonds have involved a variety of
approaches. In the cases of Pakistan, the Ukraine, and Uruguay, the
restructurings were arranged prior to defaults on the bonds, while the case of

119 See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 190-92 (describing recent trends in financing in the emerging market
economies). In addition to Brady Bonds issued in connection with restructurings of commercial loans,
sovereign debtors also issued new bonds, particularly Eurobonds. See McGovern, supra note 54, at 78
(describing the components of the market for sovereign bonds). In 1993, Brady Bonds represented 27%, and
Eurobonds represented 73%, of the bonds issued by the governments of the major emerging market
economies. In 2003, Eurobonds represented 88%, and Brady Bonds represented 12%, of these bonds. See
Brauer & McDuffy, supra note 118 (presenting data regarding issuances of Brady Bonds and Eurobonds).
120 The first of these crises, the Mexican Peso Crisis in 1994, the Asian Crisis in 1997, and the Russian
Crisis in 1998, arose from financial crises in which the values of local currencies declined substantially against
the dollar. These crises were resolved with the significant assistance of creditor governments, notably the
United States and Japan, as well as of multilateral agencies, including the IMF, and bilateral agencies, and, in
the case of the Russian Crisis, the restructuring of loans made by commercial banks. For a description of the
Mexican Peso Crisis and the Russian Crisis, see Scott, supra note 117, at 106-07, 108. See also RIEFFEL,
supra note 38, at 198-211 (describing these crises). Largely due to a reduction in the access of governments of
emerging market economies to the international capital markets in the wake of the Russian Crisis, in 1999
Brazil experienced a significant depreciation in the value of its currency. This crisis was resolved through the
provision of additional funds by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well
as a rescheduling of (short-term) loans made by commercial banks. See id. at 213-15 (describing the crisis in
Brazil). In 2000, Turkey experienced a substantial decrease in its foreign currency reserves, which was
followed by a significant decline in the value of its currency as compared to the dollar. This crisis was
resolved with significant assistance from the IMF. See id. at 215 (describing the crisis in Turkey); Scott, supra
note 117, at 109-10 (same).
121 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVIEWING THE PROCESS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING WITHIN
THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3-4, tbl.1 (2003) (summarizing recent cases of sovereign debt
restructurings), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/080103.pdf; Roubini & Setser,
supra note 9, ch. 4, at 30, 47 (same).
122 See Barham, supra note 4 (describing the Argentine default); Lapper, supra note 4 (same).
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Ecuador involved an extended period of default.123 With respect to the terms
of the bonds, the restructurings of the bonds of Pakistan and Uruguay involved
extensions of maturities, the restructuring of the bonds of the Ukraine involved
extensions of the maturities together with reductions in the interest rates borne
by the bonds, and in the case of Ecuador, the restructuring involved a reduction
in the principal amount of the outstanding bonds of approximately twentyseven percent.124 While all of these restructurings involved exchange offers,
Pakistan and Uruguay relied on ad hoc consultations with bondholders to
apprise them of the terms of the offer and to encourage them to accept the
offer, the Ukraine engaged in an extensive effort to contact bondholders, and
Ecuador essentially declined to speak with bondholders.125
C. Creditor Heterogeneity and the Divergence of Interests
The diversity in sovereign bond restructurings, in many ways, reflects the
diversity among investors in sovereign bonds. Sovereign bonds are held by
large commercial banks, smaller commercial banks, local banks, investment
banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, retail funds, hedge
funds, nonfinancial companies, and retail investors.126 Moreover, the extent to
which these various investors hold bonds issued by any particular country
differs markedly across countries and issues of bonds.127
123

Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 30.
Id. at 31.
125 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 121, tbl.1; see also RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 211-13 (describing
the restructurings of the bonds of Pakistan, the Ukraine, and Ecuador); Michael Peterson, Small Investors Flex
Their Muscles, EUROMONEY, Oct. 2000, at 20.
126 See McGovern, supra note 54, at 77 (describing the various types of holders of sovereign bonds). The
diversity of the investors in the Eurobond market has encouraged the development of new instruments. In
addition to bonds, structured debt, collateralized bond obligations, and total-return swaps have all been created
to satisfy the regulatory constraints imposed on investors. In addition, derivative instruments allow banks and
hedge funds to enhance returns while dispersing risk. Id. at 78-79 (describing the variety of instruments traded
in the market).
127 For example, in the case of Pakistan, approximately one-third of the bonds subject to the restructuring
were held by domestic residents and the remaining bonds were held by financial institutions and retail
investors in the Middle East. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 121, at 3-4, tbl.1 (summarizing recent
cases of sovereign debt restructurings). For Ecuador, the bonds were widely held by institutional investors in
New York and London. Id. For the Ukraine, three of the bonds were held by a small number of investment
banks and hedge funds, and the fourth bond was widely held by retail investors in Europe. Id. For Uruguay,
the dollar-denominated bonds were widely held by institutional investors in the United States, but more than
one-half of all the bonds were held by domestic investors, principally retail investors. Id. For Argentina, of
the approximately $100 billion principal amount of debt subject to the (current) restructuring, approximately
$50 billion is held by Argentine financial institutions, approximately $20 billion is held by retail investors in
Europe, approximately $3 billion is held by retail investors in Japan, and the remaining $27 billion is held by
institutional investors in the United States. Id.
124
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These diverse investors, like the commercial banks that held sovereign debt
in the 1970s, differ in their exposure, in the regulatory environments they
confront, in the extent of their relationships with sovereign debtors, and in their
involvement in the international capital markets. The level of heterogeneity
among these investors, however, is greater than the differences among
commercial banks. As a general matter, commercial banks follow a common
business plan. They make loans to borrowers and hold cash deposits. They
expect to make profits from the spreads between the interest rates charged on
the loans and the interest rates paid on the deposits, as well as from fees for
their services.128 Investors in sovereign bonds, on the other hand, are engaged
in a wide variety of businesses, and they purchase sovereign bonds for many
different reasons. For example, most mutual funds strive to create a diversified
portfolio of assets and so they invest only a small portion of their funds in
sovereign bonds.129 Hedge funds typically purchase relatively large positions
in sovereign bonds.130 Retail investors, in contrast, often hold sovereign bonds
as part of a long-term investment strategy, such as to provide income during
their retirement years.131 Moreover, the institutions and individuals holding
the bonds of any particular sovereign debtor continually change as the bonds
are traded in the market.132
As the group of investors holding sovereign debt has become more diverse,
vulture funds have achieved particular notoriety. Vulture funds typically trade
in distressed debt—purchasing bonds at prices that represent substantial
discounts from their face values.133 In making these purchases, vulture funds
typically seek short-term gains, either through the restructuring process or by

128

See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 38 (describing the activities of commercial banks).
See id. at 39 (describing activities of investment funds); see also INV. CO. INST., MUTUAL FUND FACT
BOOK 3 (43d ed. 2003) (describing diversification strategy of mutual funds).
130 HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 25-36 (2000).
131 See, e.g., Argentina and the IMF: Which Is the Victim?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2004, at 63, 64 (noting
that purchasers of sovereign bonds issued by Argentina include pensioners living in Italy); Suzanne Miller,
Lessons from Argentina, BANKER, Feb. 1, 2002 (describing the retail investors who purchased sovereign bonds
issued by Argentina as ranging “from dentists in Belgium to housewives in Japan”).
132 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1005-06 (noting the constantly changing identities of sovereign bondholders).
133 See, e.g., Deepak Gopinath, The Debt-Crisis Crisis, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 2002, at 36, 38
(describing the opinion of analysts that Argentina’s “bonds, trading at the equivalent of 20 cents on the dollar,
are still too expensive as a vulture play. The target: 12 cents [on the dollar]”). For a general description of the
strategies used by vulture funds, see ROSENBERG, supra note 130. For a more detailed description of the role
of vulture funds in the restructuring of sovereign bonds, see Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran,
Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 253, 254, 262-64 (2003).
129
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holding out and seeking additional payments from the debtors through
negotiated transactions or as a result of litigation.134
Investors in sovereign bonds also differ significantly in their levels of
exposure to the risk of default on the bonds. The value of the bonds held in
each portfolio as compared to the total value of the assets in the portfolio
varies across the various types of investors as well as within the various classes
of investors. Some investors may experience bankruptcy upon a default on the
bonds, others may only experience a small loss.135
Due to the growth of the secondary market, investors purchase sovereign
bonds in the market at different prices. Unlike the restructurings of the 1930s
in which investors had purchased bonds from banks at equivalent prices, and
unlike the restructurings of the 1980s in which most of the commercial banks
made loans to the sovereign debtors through the syndication process, investors
today may purchase bonds at substantial discounts from their face values.
These differences in prices create substantial disparities among bondholders.
For example, retail investors who purchase bonds at the time of their issuance,
at prices near the face values of the bonds, are likely to be reluctant to accept
the terms of a restructuring that substantially reduce the principal amounts of
the bonds.136 Other investors, notably vulture funds, who purchase the bonds
once the sovereign debtor begins to experience severe distress, pay a much
lower price for the bonds and so may be willing to accept restructuring terms
that impose significant reductions to the principal amounts of the bonds.137 In
between these two extremes, institutional investors may be willing to accept
limited reductions to the principal amounts of the bonds in a restructuring,
depending upon the magnitude of the losses or gains they have sustained.138
134

See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14 (describing the strategic behavior of vulture funds).
See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 54, at 79-80 (describing the techniques banks and investment funds
use to minimize the risk associated with investing in sovereign bonds); Richard Lapper, Creditors Unite to
Seek Better Deal on Argentine Debt, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at 3 (describing the small investors from
Japan, Italy, Germany, and several smaller European countries as among the worst affected by the current
crisis in Argentina).
136 See Felix Salmon, A United Stand for Retail Bond Investors, EUROMONEY, June 2003, at 152, 153
(describing retail investors as “want[ing] to get their money back”).
137 See Collective Indecision, EUROMONEY, Nov. 2002 (“[B]ondholders are not like banks holding
syndicated loans . . . . A hedge fund that bought at 25 [cents on the dollar] yesterday might be very happy with
a work-out that would be worth 35 [cents on the dollar] next week; a retail investor who bought at par seven
years ago would probably reject such an offer as out of hand.”).
138 See Salmon, supra note 136, at 153 (describing these investors as “want[ing] to maximize the present
value of their paper”). The purchase of sovereign bonds in the market at different prices also engenders
disagreements among investors as to the appropriate measure of the discount to be included in a restructuring
of the bonds. In the event bondholders are able to reach an agreement regarding the appropriate discount, or
135
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Investors in sovereign bonds also face significantly different regulatory
environments. Banks and other institutional investors record the values of
their portfolios of sovereign bonds at market prices, often daily and certainly
monthly or quarterly.139 Retail investors, however, typically do not perform
this exercise. By “marking to market,” banks and other institutional investors
record their gains and losses almost as they occur. 140 Retail investors typically
record gains and losses only upon sales of bonds. Because the values of their
portfolios already reflect the losses due to financial distress, banks and other
institutional investors may elect to exit a restructuring by selling their bonds in
the market, rather than holding the bonds and working to complete the
restructuring process.141 These sales further depress the price and create losses
for other investors, including retail investors. Moreover, as secondary trading
leads to shifts in the ownership of the distressed debt, it hinders efforts to reach
consensus among the bondholders.
Like the large commercial banks that guided the restructurings of the
1980s, only large investors, particularly commercial banks and investment
banks, have relationships with sovereign debtors that they are eager to use as a
basis for generating additional business.142 These investors are also the most
likely repeat players in the international capital markets with the resulting
expectations that they will work with one another in a variety of settings.143 As
a result, these investors may support restructuring plans that are unacceptable
“haircut,” to be suffered in a restructuring, they may disagree as to the point from which the discount is to be
calculated. Rather than the principal amounts of the bonds, investors who have purchased bonds at prices
equal to the face amounts may argue that the haircut should be applied with respect to the prices at which
investors purchased their bonds. See Angela Pruitt, Argentina’s Debt Workout Is Complex, WALL ST. J., Mar.
12, 2003 (reporting the comments of a lawyer who has represented parties in restructurings that “retail
investors who bought Argentina’s bonds at 100% of face value aren’t going to agree to take the same losses as
a vulture fund that scooped up the paper at distressed levels”), available at 2003 WL 3961535.
139 See McGovern, supra note 54, at 79 (describing this practice).
140 See id. (describing the consequences of this practice).
141 Id.
142 See Felix Salmon, Argentina’s Messy Debt Exchange, EUROMONEY, Dec. 2001, at 58, 60 (quoting a
senior banker at a large bank as stating: “Our firm has a much greater stake in Argentina’s prosperity than in
Argentina going off the rails. So, all things being equal, we’re going to want to help them.”); Anne O.
Krueger, The Evolution of Emerging Market Capital Flows: Why We Need to Look Again at Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, Address at the Economics Society Dinner (Jan. 21, 2002) (describing most investors in
sovereign bonds as lacking long-term relationships with sovereign debtors), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2002/012102.htm; Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 33 (describing the benefits of these
relationships as including “fees and commissions . . . from ongoing and future underwriting of a country’s
bonds and the franchise value of their commercial banking operations in the debtor country”).
143 Smaller investors, particularly retail investors, simply purchase sovereign bonds as part of their
personal investment strategies, without any expectation of participating in the sovereign debt market in any
other capacity.
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to smaller investors, notably retail investors.144 In particular, large institutional
investors may be willing to suffer a greater loss in a restructuring to solidify
relationships with a sovereign debtor and to establish a reputation for success
in restructuring sovereign bonds, both of which are likely to lead to future
business opportunities and future revenues.145 Retail investors, like the smaller
commercial banks that participated in the restructurings of the 1980s, invest in
sovereign bonds only for the returns, not for the prospect of building future
business relationships. As a result, they are unwilling to trade repayment of the
bonds for future business opportunities.146
Importantly, investors in sovereign bonds, like investors in the 1920s, lack
an effective means of reaching consensus regarding the terms of restructurings.
Although these investors generally agree on a policy of uniform treatment of
all bondholders,147 they typically cannot reach agreement on restructuring
terms. Moreover, unlike the restructurings of the 1980s, today’s creditors lack
a mechanism to impose their preferences on other investors.148
The absence of widespread support for the terms of a proposed
144 In this way, the large institutional investors, many of which have sold sovereign bonds to retail
investors, are similar to the banks that sold sovereign bonds to individual investors during the 1920s. Upon the
advent of a financial crisis affecting the bonds, the large institutional investors, like the banks, have a greater
interest in preserving and enhancing their relationships with sovereign debtors than in protecting the interests
of small investors.
145 Some commentators have suggested that sovereign debtors have an interest in proposing restructuring
terms that are most favorable to large institutional investors, as these investors are likely to purchase sovereign
bonds in the future, while retail investors, having incurred significant losses in the restructuring, are unlikely to
include sovereign bonds in their portfolios in the future. See Salmon, supra note 136, at 152 (describing the
reasons sovereign debtors may favor institutional investors over retail investors in restructurings).
146 In the case of Argentina, concern for restructuring terms that favor large institutional investors to the
detriment of small investors has led to the formation of the Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency to represent
the interests of retail investors. See id. (describing the formation of the Argentine Bond Restructuring
Agency); see also Deepak Gopinath, Default Line, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 2003, at 29, 29-30
(describing concerns regarding unfair treatment of retail investors in the Argentine restructuring). These
concerns have led Felix Salmon to propose that retail investors be “taught not to buy” sovereign bonds as a
means of “get[ting] rid of the entire class of retail investors to as great a degree as is practicable.” Felix
Salmon, Stop Selling Bonds to Retail Investors, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2004).
147 See Salmon, supra note 142, at 58 (stating than “[i]f bondholders are concerned about one issue above
all others, it’s that of equal treatment”).
148 See Gopinath, supra note 133, at 37 (“[R]esolving debt crises has already become a more complicated
tactical proposition than it was in the notorious Latin American default-a-month era of the 1980s. Then
commercial banks were . . . susceptible to government suasion. They could be coerced and cajoled into
undertaking elaborate debt restructurings that kept countries afloat. Now the vast bulk of emerging-markets
debt is held by widely dispersed and difficult to identify bondholders who don’t readily kowtow to government
officials.”); Krueger, supra note 142 (describing most sovereign bond investors as not “fear[ing] the armtwisting of regulators”).
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restructuring contributes to the decision of some bondholders to hold out and
to refuse to support the restructuring. These holdout bondholders may instead
pursue their claims against the sovereign debtor in court. We next explore the
developing role of litigation in the enforcement of claims against sovereign
debtors.
II. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
At the same time that the identities and interests of creditors have become
more heterogeneous, increasing the likelihood of holdouts, the ability of
holdout creditors to pursue litigation remedies has also increased. Courts in
the United States have rejected the various defenses sovereign debtors have
raised in suits brought by creditors, providing creditors with unprecedented
access to litigation.
In the restructurings of the 1930s, litigation was not a viable option for
holdout creditors. The agreements governing the bonds generally did provide
protections for the holders of the bonds, including a pledge of the good faith
and credit of the issuing government149 and security clauses assigning specific
sources of governmental revenues or specific governmental properties to fulfill
Upon default, however, these contractual
servicing requirements.150
protections provided little real protection to the holders of the bonds. The
sovereign debtors, with the powers and rights of nations, could not be sued
without their consent.151
The power of the sovereign immunity defense to block creditor litigation in
the United States was subsequently significantly reduced. In 1952, the
Executive Branch of the United States adopted a restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, which was announced in the “Tate Letter.”152 The restrictive theory
provided that sovereigns retained “immunity for their public or sovereign acts,

149

Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 61.
BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 83-89.
151 See Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Since the founding of
the nation to the latter half of the twentieth century, foreign sovereigns enjoyed absolute immunity from suit in
United States courts.”); Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 336 (stating that “[c]reditors had essentially
no enforceable rights [during the 1930s], primarily because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity”).
152 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting Attorney General
Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 712-13 (1976); see Turkmani, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 170-71
(describing Tate Letter).
150
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but could be sued in U.S. courts for their commercial or private acts.”153
Congress codified the Executive Branch’s theory in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).154 Thereafter, in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc.155 the Supreme Court held that issuing sovereign bonds
constituted commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA.156 The Court
further held that Argentina’s rescheduling of its bonds, which involved the
payment of interest through New York-based accounts, had a sufficiently
“direct effect” within the United States to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
under the FSIA.157
Following the adoption of the FSIA, courts widely interpreted the issuance
of public debt as commercial activity for the purposes of sovereign immunity
analysis. This interpretation significantly reduced the viability of a sovereign
immunity defense.158 At the same time, sovereign debtors increasingly waived
their sovereign immunity and explicitly consented to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.159 The predictable consequence of these developments was an effort by
creditors to enforce their claims against sovereign debtors through litigation.
The first of these efforts occurred in the early 1980s. Similar to other
emerging market economies in Latin America, in 1981 Costa Rica experienced
a shortage of foreign currency with which to pay its external debt, including
loans owed to commercial banks.160 In an effort to alleviate this crisis, in July
of 1981, the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica passed a
153

Turkmani, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
Id. A plurality of the Supreme Court had announced, six months prior to the adoption of the FSIA,
that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity would not prevent subjecting a foreign sovereign to suit for
“participation in the marketplace in the manner of a private citizen or corporation.” Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (citing Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698-705).
155 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
156 Id. at 614-15.
157 Id. at 618-19.
158 The FSIA can still limit plaintiffs’ attempts to attach assets located in the United States pursuant to a
foreign judgment. See Corzo v. Banco Central de Reserva Del Peru, 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001) (refusing to
exercise jurisdiction over suit to enforce Peruvian judgment and concluding that submission to jurisdiction in
foreign court did not amount to waiver of sovereign immunity in the United States).
159 See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 676 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1982)
(describing Banco Nacional as an instrumentality of the government of Costa Rica and recounting its waiver of
“any right or immunity from legal proceedings including suit judgment and execution on grounds of
sovereignty which it or its property may now or hereafter enjoy”); see also Proyecfin de Venez., S.A. v. Banco
Industrial de Venez., S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding waiver of sovereign immunity in loan
agreement); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. People’s Republic of Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(same).
160 See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 29 (describing the financial crisis in Costa Rica).
154
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resolution prohibiting all state-owned entities from paying interest or principal
owing on debts to foreign creditors and denominated in foreign currency.161
The inability of a syndicate of commercial banks to obtain repayment of a
$40 million loan made to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (Banco Nacional) led
the syndicate to seek an order of attachment in New York state court.162 Banco
Nacional first defaulted in the state court proceeding.163 Then, after the
syndicate obtained an order of attachment for Banco Nacional’s property in
New York and successfully attached $800,000 in assets, Banco Nacional
entered an appearance, removed the action to federal court, and moved to
vacate the order of attachment on the grounds of sovereign immunity.164 The
Second Circuit held that the foreign state had explicitly waived in writing all
sovereign immunity and upheld the attachment.165
When the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, Banco Nacional tried an
alternative approach, arguing that events in Costa Rica constituted a defense to
repayment under the act of state doctrine.166 The court held that the act of state
doctrine precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into “the validity of foreign
seizures only when there is ‘a taking of property within its own territory by a
foreign sovereign government.’”167 The court held that, in this case, the act of
state doctrine did not apply because the property that was the subject of the
litigation was located in the United States, not in Costa Rica. “[T]he situs of
the debt owed by Banco Nacional was in this nation at the time that the foreign
currency decrees were enacted.”168 Finding that the act of state doctrine was
the only issue on which the parties disagreed, the court ordered summary
judgment in favor of the syndicate.169
Although the court was ready to enter judgment against it, Banco Nacional
moved for reargument in order to put forward a third defense, arguing that

161 See Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(describing the moratorium); Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 29 (discussing the response to the crisis in Costa
Rica); see also Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 11 (describing events surrounding the crisis in Costa Rica).
162 Libra Bank, 676 F.2d at 48.
163 Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
164 Id.
165 Libra Bank, 676 F.2d at 50.
166 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 876.
167 Id. at 877 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1968)).
168 Id. at 881. The court noted that the loan agreement provided for the application of New York law and
that all payments under the agreement were to be made in New York. Id. at 881-82.
169 Id. at 896-97.
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Article VIII, section 2(b) of the IMF Bretton Woods Agreement170 prohibited
enforcement of the loan agreement.171 The Bretton Woods Agreement
provides that “[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of any member
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member
maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be
unenforceable in the territories of any member.”172 The court rejected this
third defense. In reaching this result, the court considered two competing
interpretations of the term “exchange contract,” a broad interpretation and a
narrow one.173 Reasoning that a definition of the term sufficiently expansive to
include loan agreements would “[do] violence to the text of the section,” the
court opted for the narrow definition.174 The court therefore held that “a
contract to borrow United States currency, which requires repayment in United
States currency, and which designates New York as the situs of repayment, is
not an exchange contract within the meaning of Article VIII, section 2(b)” and
that the Bretton Woods Agreement was therefore inapplicable.175
The Libra Bank litigation illustrates both the growing potential of creditor
litigation as a remedy against a defaulting sovereign debtor and the limitations
of the remedy. The decisions recognized the validity of the syndicate’s
contractual claim and rejected a variety of defenses. Thus, the decisions made
clear that enforcement litigation is a viable option for creditors. At the same
time, the outcome of the litigation demonstrates the shortcomings of the
option. Although at the time of the decision the syndicate was owed
approximately $35 million in principal and interest, Banco Nacional only held
about $2.5 million in assets in New York, of which the syndicate was only able
to attach $800,000.176
A second case arising out of the financial crisis in Costa Rica, Allied Bank
International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,177 introduced the prospect
170 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2
U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended).
171 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 896.
172 Id. at 897.
173 See id. (describing broad and narrow interpretations).
174 Id. at 899 (citations omitted). The court noted that other courts had adopted the narrow interpretation
and that the broader view had been supported primarily by commentators. Id.
175 Id. at 900.
176 Id. at 882; see Joseph B. Frumkin, Comment, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign
Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 493-94
(1985) (arguing that the limited prospect of satisfying the judgment through assets located in New York should
have led the court to dismiss the litigation under the act of state doctrine).
177 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter Allied Bank], aff’d, 733 F.2d 23, 1984 U.S. App.
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of holdout litigation. Allied Bank International (Allied Bank), as agent for a
syndicate of thirty-nine commercial banks that had participated in a loan to
three banks wholly owned by Costa Rica, filed suit in federal court based on
the failure of the debtors to make payments required by the loan.178 As in
Libra Bank, the failure to make the payments was a consequence of the
imposition of the exchange controls prohibiting the servicing of obligations
owed to foreign creditors.179 The district court, relying on the act of state
doctrine, which bars the courts of one country from sitting in judgment on the
acts of the government of another, done in its own territory, denied Allied
Bank’s motion for summary judgment.180
While the case was pending before the district court, the parties entered
into negotiations to restructure the loan.181 Thirty-eight members of the bank
syndicate were able to reach an agreement with the debtors to restructure the
loan, but one member of the syndicate, Fidelity Union Trust Company of New
Jersey (Fidelity), refused to ratify the agreement or to participate in the
restructuring plan.182 Allied Bank subsequently appealed the district court
decision on behalf of Fidelity, the sole holdout creditor.183 The Second Circuit
initially agreed with the district court that the suit should not be heard,
dismissing it on grounds of comity.184
Apparently, the New York financial community reacted adversely to the
decision, fearing that New York would lose its status as a center for
multinational financial transactions if New York courts were unwilling to
enforce loan agreements against sovereign debtors.185 In any event, the court
subsequently agreed to rehear the case. The Justice Department submitted an
amicus brief explaining that, although its position was to encourage the
cooperative restructuring of sovereign debt, this position was “grounded in the
understanding that, while parties may agree to renegotiate conditions of
LEXIS 23237 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) [hereinafter Allied Bank I], rev’d on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516 (2d
Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Allied Bank II].
178 Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1442.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1444. Several weeks later, the action was dismissed by agreement of the parties after they
stipulated that no factual issues remained with respect to the act of state doctrine. Allied Bank I, 1984 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23237, at *5.
181 Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 519.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Allied Bank I, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23237, at *12.
185 William W. Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in International Banking, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067, 1075-76
(1989).
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payment, the underlying obligations to pay nevertheless remain valid and
enforceable.”186 The Justice Department explained that the imposition of
unilateral exchange controls by Costa Rica was therefore inconsistent with
U.S. policy.187
Fidelity’s position was also supported by the New York Clearing House
Association (Clearing House), which filed an amicus brief.188 The Clearing
House’s position was seemingly motivated by a desire to establish
unambiguous legal precedent for enforcing the rights of commercial banks and
other creditors against sovereign debtors.189 A judicial decision favorable to
the claim, although detrimental to their general approach to restructuring plans,
would provide bank advisory committees (and other commercial banks) with
additional leverage in negotiating agreements with sovereign debtors and in
developing restructuring plans in future crises.190
Upon rehearing, the Second Circuit concluded that the act of state doctrine
did not bar the lawsuit because the situs of the debt at issue was New York, not
Costa Rica. As the court explained:
The Costa Rican banks conceded jurisdiction in New York and they
agreed to pay the debt in New York City in United States dollars.
Allied [Bank], the designated syndicate agent, is located in the
United States, specifically in New York; some of the negotiations
between the parties took place in the United States. The United
States has an interest in maintaining New York’s status as one of the
foremost commercial centers in the world. Further, New York is the
international clearing center for United States dollars. In addition to
other international activities, United States banks lend billions of
dollars to foreign debtors each year. The United States has an
interest in ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in the United
States in United States dollars under contracts subject to the
jurisdiction of United States courts may assume that, except under
the most extraordinary circumstances, their rights will be determined

186

Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 519.
Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 6-7, 18, Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d 516 (No. 83-7714).
188 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 30. The Clearing House was comprised of twelve large commercial
banks located in the United States. Many of these banks had portfolios of loans to sovereign debtors in which
the total amount of the loans exceeded the total value of their assets. As a result, these banks were deeply
involved in the restructuring process, and they worked diligently to avoid defaults on the loans. See id.
(describing the Clearing House).
189 See id. at 30-31 (discussing the likely motivations of the members of the Clearing House).
190 Id.
187
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in accordance with recognized principles of contract law.191

The court went on to reject the argument that principles of comity should bar
the suit, reasoning that “[t]he Costa Rican government’s unilateral attempt to
repudiate private, commercial obligations is inconsistent with the orderly
resolution of international debt problems. It is similarly contrary to the
interests of the United States, a major source of private international credit.”192
The court then granted Allied Bank’s motion for summary judgment.193
The two Costa Rica cases thus opened the door to creditor litigation in
general and holdout litigation in particular. Moreover, the positions of the
Justice Department and the Clearing House, as articulated in Allied Bank II,
suggest a clear relationship between the availability of judicial enforcement of
loan agreements against defaulting sovereigns and the functioning of the
sovereign debt market. In particular, as the amici observed, even if voluntary
restructurings are in the interests of both creditors and debtors, judicial
enforcement gives creditors valuable leverage to bring to the negotiating table.
As sovereign debt litigation continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
courts adhered to the approach in the Costa Rica cases. In particular, courts
found that neither international political considerations nor the plaintiff’s
unwillingness to participate in a voluntary restructuring operated to bar
recovery. Instead, the courts evidenced a repeated willingness both to take
jurisdiction and to resolve the cases promptly upon motions for summary
judgment. A.I. Credit Corp. v. Government of Jamaica194 is a typical case.
Following three reschedulings of its debt in 1978, 1979, and 1981, Jamaica
entered into a fourth rescheduling in 1984.195 Like the previous reschedulings,
this one did not prove workable, and almost immediately Jamaica and its
lenders entered into a fifth and then a sixth rescheduling.196 A.I. Credit Corp.
(AICO), which had received approximately $10 million in debt, plus interest,
through an assignment effected after the 1984 restructuring, did not participate
in the fifth and sixth reschedulings and instead sued for payment based on the
terms of the fourth rescheduling.197 The court observed that although the
reschedulings affected debts owed to some 113 financial institutions, AICO
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 521-22.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 523.
666 F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was the only party to bring suit.198 The court found that the terms of the 1984
agreement explicitly provided AICO with an individual right to bring suit to
enforce the agreement.199 The court then concluded that there was no
outstanding issue of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff.200
Sovereign debtors, however, have not been entirely powerless in these
lawsuits. In particular, carefully drafted debt instruments have enabled
defendants to block holdout litigation. An example can be found in the
litigation by CIBC Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Limited (CIBC Bank),
on behalf of the Dart family, against Banco Central do Brasil (Banco do
Brasil).201 Brazil negotiated a Multi-Year Deposit Facility Agreement
(MYDFA) as part of the restructuring of its debt in the 1980s.202 The MYDFA
provided, among its terms, that the debt could be accelerated upon an event of
default only if more than fifty percent of the creditors, calculated by amount of
debt holdings, voted to accelerate.203 Just a year after the MYDFA was
consummated, Brazil was unable to meet its obligations to creditors and sought
to restructure the MYDFA debt pursuant to the Brady Plan. The Dart family
refused to go along with the new restructuring and instead filed suit seeking
both to obtain the accrued and unpaid interest on their approximately $1.4
billion of MYDFA debt and to accelerate the entire principal amount of the
MYDFA.204
CIBC Bank’s effort to accelerate was blocked by Brazil’s careful approach
to the new restructuring. In connection with the restructuring, Brazilian
officials ordered Banco do Brasil, a Brazilian commercial bank fifty-one
percent owned by the Brazilian Treasury, to retain $1.6 billion of MYDFA
debt rather than converting all of its holdings to Brady Bonds. By retaining a
majority of the outstanding MYDFA debt, Banco do Brasil was able to prevent
CIBC Bank from obtaining a majority vote in favor of accelerating the debt.205
In the litigation that followed, the court rejected Banco do Brasil’s defenses
of improper assignment and champerty, yet it upheld Brazil’s move to block
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id.
Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 633.
CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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acceleration of the debt. The court observed that the plain terms of the contract
required a majority vote to accelerate and that CIBC Bank did not hold a
majority of the outstanding debt.206 Moreover, the court refused to imply an
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in order to invalidate Banco do
Brasil’s actions to block the acceleration.207 Significantly, the court observed
that the implied covenants sought by CIBC Bank would have the effect of
substantially altering the rights of the parties and would impair the ability of
debtors and creditors “to order their relationships through contractual debt
agreements.”208 Indeed, the court expressly acknowledged that the provisions
allowed Banco do Brasil to retain and vote its share of the MYDFA debt in
order to hinder another creditor’s attempt to accelerate that debt.209 The
consequence of the court’s ruling was to permit the litigation seeking accrued
and unpaid interest to proceed, but to bar acceleration. This had the effect of
reducing CIBC Bank’s claimed damages from more than $1.4 billion to only
$60 million.
Sovereign debtors in more recent cases have attempted to raise additional
defenses. In virtually every case, however, courts have rejected these defenses
in favor of protecting the enforceability of sovereign debt obligations through
litigation. Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru210 involved
debt originally borrowed by Banco Popular del Peru (Banco Popular) from the
Mellon Bank of Pittsburgh. The debt, which was guaranteed by the
government of Peru, was subsequently sold to Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd.
(Pravin) in the secondary market at a deep discount.211 In addition to arguing
that the case should be dismissed based on principles of comity, Banco Popular
and Peru argued that the assignment of the debt to the plaintiff was invalid,
barring the plaintiff’s claim.212 The Second Circuit rejected these arguments
and awarded summary judgment to Pravin in the amount of $2,161,539.78 plus
interest.213
On the issue of comity, the court expanded on its analysis in Allied Bank.214
The court identified two competing U.S. policies implicated by sovereign debt
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1115 (calling CIBC Bank’s argument “quite creative, [but] wholly unpersuasive”).
Id. at 1116.
Id.
109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 853.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 853-54, 856.
Id. at 855.
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litigation. On the one hand, the United States encourages the resolution of
foreign debt restructurings through Brady Plan negotiations.215 On the other
hand, the United States has a strong interest in ensuring the continued
enforceability of foreign debts owed to U.S. lenders.216 The court concluded
that the second interest limited the first so as to require that creditor
participation in restructurings be voluntary, supported by the backdrop of the
creditor’s continued right to enforce the debt.217 Accordingly, the court found
that principles of comity did not preclude a grant of summary judgment.218
The court also considered the defendants’ argument that the assignment of
the debt to Pravin was improper. The terms of the debt instrument authorized
the creditor to assign its interest in the instrument “to any financial
institution.”219 Peru argued that this language should be interpreted to preclude
an assignment to Pravin, which was not a bank.220 The court rejected this
argument, explaining that, under New York law, only express limitations on
assignability are enforceable.221 The court then concluded that the language in
question permitted assignment of the debt to financial institutions but did not
explicitly limit assignments only to those entities.222 Accordingly, it concluded
that the assignment was valid whether or not Pravin was properly characterized
as a financial institution.223
Perhaps the best known instance of creditor litigation is the successful suit
by Elliott Associates, L.P. (Elliott), a vulture fund, against Peru.224 Elliott
purchased in the secondary market approximately $20 million principal
amount of letter agreements issued by Banco de la Nacion and Banco Popular
and guaranteed by Peru for approximately $11 million, slightly more than
fifty-five percent of the face value of the debt.225 At the time Elliott purchased
the letter agreements, Peru was in the process of negotiating a restructuring of
its debt under the Brady Plan.226 Elliott refused to participate in the
215

Id.
Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 856.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
225 Id. at 366-67.
226 Id. at 368. Interestingly, Elliott purchased the letter agreements shortly after the favorable decision in
Pravin. Id. at 367.
216
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restructuring and demanded full payment of the letter agreements.227 When
Peru refused to pay, Elliott sued in New York Supreme Court, from which the
case was subsequently removed to federal court.228 Although the district court
originally dismissed the suit, holding that it violated the prohibition on
champerty under section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law,229 the decision
was overturned by the Second Circuit.230
As in Pravin, Peru argued that the assignment of debt to Elliott was
invalid.231 The district court, relying on the Pravin decision, rejected this
argument.232 Peru also argued that Elliott purchased the debt “with the intent
and for the purpose of bringing” litigation, thereby rendering the purchase a
violation of the prohibition of champerty imposed by the New York Judiciary
Law.233 The court dismissed the suit, finding that Elliott had, indeed, violated
the statute.234 The Second Circuit, however, reversed.235 After an extensive
review of the history both of the New York statute and the underlying
principles of champerty, the court concluded that the “acquisition of a debt
with intent to bring suit against the debtor is not a violation of the statute where
. . . the primary purpose of the suit is the collection of the debt acquired.”236
Moreover, the court found that Elliott’s primary purpose in acquiring the debt
was to be paid in full, and that any intent to litigate was merely “incidental and
contingent.”237 Upon remand, the district court granted summary judgment,
awarding Elliott more than $55 million.238
Like the syndicate of commercial banks in Libra Bank (and most creditors
that successfully sue sovereign debtors), Elliott then confronted the principal
limitation of the litigation remedy: the inability to enforce its judgment.239 For
any creditor, the utility of a judgment depends upon its access to attachable
assets. Defaulting sovereigns, however, rarely leave assets in jurisdictions in
227

Id. at 368.
Id.
229 Id. at 369.
230 Id. at 381.
231 Id. at 367-68.
232 Id. at 368 n.1.
233 Id. at 368-69.
234 Id. at 369.
235 Id. at 381.
236 Id. at 372.
237 Id. at 379.
238 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14169 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000).
239 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14 (describing difficulties associated with enforcement of claims
against sovereign debtors).
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which attachment is possible. A judgment is unlikely to be enforced in a
sovereign’s own courts, within whose jurisdiction most of the sovereign’s
assets are located. Moreover, contractual waivers of sovereign immunity may
not enable the creditor to obtain orders of attachment in other jurisdictions.
Elliott, for example, made several attempts to collect its judgment in New
York by seeking orders of attachment against financial intermediaries, but
those efforts were unsuccessful.
Consequently, Elliott took another approach. Peru was about to make the
first interest payment on the Brady Bonds that it had issued in connection with
the restructuring of its debt. This payment involved the transfer of funds from
Peru to the Euroclear System, in Belgium, which would then make payment to
individual bondholders. Arguing that the pari passu clause in the debt
agreement precluded Peru from making payments on some of its debt contracts
and not others, Elliott sued in a Brussels court to obtain an order of attachment
on the transferred funds.240 The court accepted Elliott’s interpretation of the
pari passu clause and ordered the attachment.241 Faced with an inability to pay
interest on its restructured debt and the prospect of being forced into another
default, Peru settled, paying Elliott approximately $58 million.242
Recent decisions reflect both the outcome and the policy considerations of
the earlier precedents. For example, in Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia,243 the
District Court for the District of Columbia relied on the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the New York champerty statute in Elliott Associates.244
Moreover, the court acknowledged the importance of the policy considerations
reflected in the New York courts’ acceptance of litigation to enforce sovereign
debt. Quoting the Elliott Associates decision, the Turkmani court explained
that enforcement would serve the long-term interests of both sovereign debtors
and the debt markets by reducing the nonpayment risk associated with an
investment in sovereign debt.245 After also rejecting the defendant’s sovereign

240 Elliott’s interpretation of the pari passu clause is explored at length in William W. Bratton, Pari Passu
and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823 (2004), and Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah
S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004).
241 See Bratton, supra note 240, at 824 (discussing the outcome of the litigation). It is unclear why, even
under Elliott’s argument, the court needed to attach all the transferred funds. Elliott’s right to payment under
the pari passu clause, if established, should at most have enabled it to share in the payment in proportion to the
share that its judgment represented of Peru’s outstanding debt.
242 Peru Settles Dispute with Elliott of U.S. on Brady Payments, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2000, at A21.
243 193 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2002).
244 Id. at 179-80.
245 Id. at 181-82.
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immunity defense, the court awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff.246
The restructuring of Argentina’s sovereign debt has already created new
tests for the scope of creditor litigation. A number of bondholders have filed
breach of contract suits, both individual and class actions, against Argentina.247
These lawsuits have been fueled, in part, by Argentina’s proposed seventy-five
percent haircut for existing debt. Although several of the class actions were
dismissed by the court on the grounds that they were unmanageable or that the
plaintiff class was poorly defined, the court has granted summary judgment to
various individual bondholders.248 The court’s analysis is straightforward:
“The obligations of [Argentina] on the bonds involved in these lawsuits is
unconditional. Sovereign immunity has been waived. [Argentina] defaulted
on the bonds when it ceased to pay the interest. This would seem to mean that
[Argentina] now owes the three plaintiffs principal and accrued interest.”249
In particular, the court explicitly rejected Argentina’s defenses, including
those based on the act of state doctrine, considerations of comity, and section
489 of the New York Judiciary Law.250 In granting summary judgment in
favor of various individual plaintiffs, the court temporarily stayed its judgment
to permit Argentina to propose a restructuring plan.251 In one of the most
recent decisions, H.W. Urban GmbH v. Argentina,252 the court granted a
motion for certification of a class of holders of two series of Argentine bonds.
The court’s decision was the first to certify a class action in connection with a
major sovereign debt restructuring.253

246 Id. at 182. The lawsuit against Bolivia for defaulting on its sinking fund bonds was initially filed as a
class action. The class litigation was settled for payments of thirty-three percent of the face value of the bonds.
At the same time, the Paris Club creditors entered into an agreement with Bolivia providing for a restructuring
of Bolivia’s debt on the same terms. Id. at 168. Turkmani opted out of the litigation class and pursued a
separate lawsuit, seeking to recover approximately $266,000 in principal and accrued interest. Id. at 169.
247 See Pamela Druckerman, Frustrated Argentine Bondholders Try Suing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2002, at
A6.
248 See, e.g., Allan Applestein TTEE FBO D.C.A. Grantor Trust v. Province of Buenos Aires, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7128, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003); Lightwater Corp. v. Argentina, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6156, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003).
249 Lightwater Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6156, at *10-11.
250 Id. at *11-13.
251 See, e.g., Lightwater Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14868 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2003) (extending the stay).
252 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23363 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2003).
253 Pruitt, supra note 7.
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III. THE ROLE OF HOLDOUT LITIGATION
A. Responses to Holdout Litigation
These recent cases of holdout litigation have heightened the urgency of the
ongoing debate regarding the best means of limiting the power of holdout
creditors. Efforts by individual creditors, particularly vulture funds, to enforce
their claims against sovereign debtors in court have been characterized as
disruptive to the restructuring process and unfair to the creditors that
participate in the restructurings.254 Vulture funds, in particular, have been
criticized for purchasing sovereign debt at distressed prices and then holding
out of restructuring plans, including plans that are acceptable to the vast
majority of the other creditors, in an effort to secure for themselves higher
payments from sovereign debtors.255 Holdout creditors may seek to be paid the
total amounts owed on the debts.256 Alternatively, they may seek a relatively
small premium over the proposed restructuring terms in an effort to coerce the
debtors to avoid the nuisance costs associated with holdout litigation.257
The resulting disruption in the restructuring process, critics argue,
lengthens the time needed to complete restructurings and thereby increases the
associated costs, burdening the citizens of the debtors and reducing the funds
available to be paid to creditors.258 Preferential payments to vulture funds
254 See, e.g., Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14 (describing criticisms of holdout creditors in general and
vulture funds in particular in the context of sovereign bond restructurings); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati,
Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 60-65 (2000) (describing strategies of
holdout creditors in the context of sovereign bond restructurings); Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1233-40
(describing criticisms of holdout creditors in general and vulture funds in particular).
255 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 130, at 32-36 (describing criticisms of vulture funds as disrupting
the restructuring process); Suniati Yap, Investing in Chapter 11 Companies: Vultures or White Knights?, 2 SW.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 153, 160-61 (1995) (describing the impact of vulture funds on the restructuring process).
256 In this regard, Elliott’s suit against Peru was typical. See also Arturo C. Porzecanski, Dealing with
Sovereign Debt: Trends and Implications, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS (Chris Jochnick & Fraser
Preston eds., forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 30) (describing vulture funds as “hav[ing] been attracted to
defaulted emerging-markets debt in recent years, buying paper (bank loans, supplier credits or bonds) with the
intention
of
suing
for
full
recovery”),
available
at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/international/documents/Porzecanski_000.pdf.
257 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 130, at 259, 259-66 (describing litigation strategies of vulture funds
that are designed to “prompt other parties to throw them a morsel just so they’ll go away”).
258 See, e.g., Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of HoldOuts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 159, 164 (2000) (describing the
difficulties for sovereign debtors and other creditors created by holdout litigation); John Nolan, Emerging
Market Debt and Vulture Hedge Funds: Free-Ridership, Legal & Market Remedies 7-8 (Fin. Policy Forum,
Derivatives Study Ctr. Special Policy Report 8, Sept. 29, 2001) (describing the costs imposed by holdout
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further reduce the size of the payments that can be made to creditors under
restructuring plans, augmenting the sense of unfairness among the creditors
that accept the terms of the restructurings.259 Finally, critics argue that the
potential for vulture funds to disrupt restructurings and to receive special
payments not only discourages sovereign debtors from entering into the
restructuring process but it also creates a collective action problem that
dissuades other creditors from participating in the process.260
Participants in the restructuring process have long sought ways to constrain
the ability of dissenting creditors to thwart efforts to restructure sovereign debt
and to secure favorable outcomes for themselves. During the restructurings of
the 1980s, bank advisory committees and sovereign debtors supported
restructuring plans that treated all commercial banks equally as a means of
minimizing both the costs of the restructuring process and the risks of
individual banks dissenting from the plans and seeking higher payments on
their loans. By credibly committing to supporting only these plans, and by
exploiting the business relationships among banks, the bank advisory
committees, working with governmental regulators and the IMF, were able to
pressure dissenting banks into supporting the proposed restructuring plans.
Bondholders, particularly vulture funds, are not susceptible to these types
of pressure.261 They act independently, seeking the highest immediate return
on their investments, including their purchases of sovereign bonds, without
concern for developing relationships with sovereign debtors or with other

creditors), available at http://www.financialpolicy.org/DSCNolan.htm.
259 As Mr. Buchheit describes the situation:
It is only by virtue of the indulgence shown by the majority of creditors that the sovereign
[debtor] has the money to pay—or settle on preferential terms—the claims of the more exacting
few. This resentment can be aggravated where the [vulture fund] bought [its] claim on the
secondary market at a small fraction of its face value, while the original [creditors] advanced 100
cents on the dollar. It is like giving up your seat on a crowded bus to an elderly woman only to
watch a teenager jump on it.
Christopher Stoakes, Beware the Maverick Sovereign Creditor, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1996, at 42, 42 (quoting
Lee Buchheit); see also Yap, supra note 255, at 162 (discussing criticisms of the “inherent unfairness” of
payments to vulture funds while other creditors suffer losses); Nolan, supra note 258, at 7-8 (describing abuses
by vulture funds).
260 Dr. Krueger has made this point several times. See Krueger, New Approach, supra note 3; Krueger,
Update, supra note 3; see also Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 133, at 259-60 (describing the role of holdout
creditors, particularly vulture funds, in giving rise to the “classic collective action problem”).
261 In addition, even though bondholders voice support for restructuring plans that treat all bondholders
equally, no dominant holder (or group of holders) is able to pledge convincingly to support only plans that
provide for the equal treatment of bondholders.
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investors. They are not swayed by the urgings of regulators or directors of
multilateral institutions. As a result, they are often able to secure substantial
payments―special treatment―for themselves, while disadvantaging other
creditors and harming sovereign debtors.
The imperviousness of vulture funds to existing sources of pressure,
coupled with the perceived success of vulture funds in suing sovereign debtors,
largely based on Elliott’s suit against Peru, have increased concerns that
holdout creditors may disrupt restructurings. The Argentine restructuring is
viewed as particularly vulnerable.262 These concerns have led to widespread
reform efforts to eliminate, or at least limit, the ability of recalcitrant
bondholders to dissent from restructurings and pursue their claims against
sovereign debtors in courts. 263
There are three main approaches to addressing the holdout problem. The
first is a market-based approach in which the sovereign restructures the debt
through an exchange offer coupled with amendments to the terms of the
original debt effected through exit consents. The second is a contractual
mechanism, the use of CACs to facilitate the negotiation of a restructuring
between the sovereign debtor and its creditors by enabling a majority of
creditors to amend the terms of the debt over the objections of the holdouts.
The third is an international bankruptcy procedure, the SDRM.
1. Exchange Offers and Exit Consents
Exchange offers permit debt to be restructured through a market process
without the involvement of any legal tribunal and without any modifications to
existing law.264 Essentially, an exchange offer is an offer by the sovereign to
exchange new debt for old. Because a bondholder’s decision to accept an
exchange offer is voluntary, debtors that conduct exchange offers face a
potential holdout problem. Bondholders may refuse the offer in hopes of
obtaining better terms as a holdout, either by forcing the debtor to buy them
262 In discussing Elliott’s successful suit against Peru, Dr. Krueger stated that “this case―and the
possibility that rogue creditors will open other legal avenues―shines a spotlight on what is a missing element
from the international community’s current approach to the roles of public and private sectors in debt
restructuring.” Krueger, New Approach, supra note 3.
263 See Gopinath, supra note 133, at 37 (describing the difficulties of the restructuring in Argentina and
noting “[t]he vultures are circling Argentina now”).
264 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 254, at 62 (observing that exit consents, unlike other proposals to
address the holdout creditor problem, are not “hampered . . . by the need to change existing laws, pass new
laws, or alter long-standing documentation practices”).
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out at a higher price in order to proceed with the restructuring or by continuing
to receive payments in accordance with the terms of the original debt.
Exit consents are designed to mitigate the holdout problem. As a condition
of the exchange offer, creditors accepting the offer are required to consent to
various modifications to the terms of the original debt that reduce its value.
Although amendments to the payment terms―principal and interest―by fewer
than all of the holders are not permissible if the bonds have a uniform action
clause (UAC), other terms can typically be modified by a majority or
supermajority. Waivers of sovereign immunity, submission to jurisdiction,
financial covenants, and listing obligations are examples of such terms.265 The
amendments are designed to make the original bonds less valuable, thereby
making their retention less attractive to investors.266 Holders are thus
pressured to accept the exchange offer rather than to hold out.
The use of exit consents was pioneered in the 1980s in connection with
corporate recapitalizations that typically involved restructurings of high-yield
bonds.267 Courts generally accepted the approach. In the leading case, Katz v.
Oak Industries Inc.,268 the debtor offered to exchange its bonds for certificates
guaranteeing (almost immediately) payment of cash sums that were greater
than the market values of the bonds (but less than the face amounts of the
bonds).269 As a condition to accepting the offer, bondholders were required to
vote in favor of amendments to the terms of the bonds that eliminated all the
financial covenants protecting the value of the bonds.270 Although the offer
was challenged as violating the contractual obligation of good faith and fair
dealing, the Delaware Chancery court upheld it.271
More recently, Pakistan, Ecuador, and Uruguay have used exchange offers
coupled with exit consents to restructure their bonds. In the case of Ecuador,
the approach resulted in approximately ninety-seven percent of the
bondholders participating in the restructuring, which involved a substantial

265

Id. at 81-82.
In addition, as more holders accept the exchange offer, the bonds become less liquid, further reducing
their value. As the bonds lose value, they become even less attractive to investors.
267 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 254, at 67; see also Sris Chatterjee et al., Coercive Tender and
Exchange Offers in Distressed High-Yield Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Analysis, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 333
(1995) (empirically examining price, success rates, and holdout rates in domestic exchange offers).
268 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
269 Id. at 876-77.
270 Id. at 877.
271 Id. at 882.
266
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reduction in the total stock of debt.272 In accepting the offer to exchange Brady
Bonds and Eurobonds,
tendering bondholders automatically agreed to amend the old bonds
to remove the cross-default and negative pledge clauses, to allow
Ecuador to reacquire and to hold certain of its Brady Bonds (thereby
making it impossible for remaining bondholders to accelerate those
instruments after the exchange), and to delist the old bonds.273

Commentators report that the presence of the exit amendments played a
“significant” role in “persuading” some bondholders to accept the exchange
offer.274
Despite the successful use of exchange offers and exit consents, it is
unlikely that this approach will be viable in all circumstances. The magnitude
of the changes to the payment terms of the original bonds, particularly the
reduction in the total principal amount of the bonds, necessary to relieve the
sovereign debtor’s financial crisis may be so great as to prohibit an exchange
from being economically feasible. Alternatively, a court may find the exit
amendments to be too substantial and refuse to enforce them against
holdouts.275 Finally, in some cases, the buoying-up effect of the restructuring
may be sufficiently great to overcome the negative effects of the exit consents.
By holding out, a bondholder retains the original bonds, with the original
payment terms but without the protective covenants, so that the value of the
bonds is reduced. Upon completion of the restructuring, however, the
sovereign debtor’s total debt burden is reduced, thereby increasing the value of
the bonds. This increase in value caused by the restructuring, often called the
“buoying-up” effect, may be greater than the decrease in value caused by the
exit consents.276
2. Collective Action Clauses
CACs permit a majority or supermajority of bondholders to change the
272

Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 254, at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
274 Id.
275 See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J.
1317, 1346 (2002).
276 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14 (describing the buoying-up effect); Wheeler & Attaran, supra note
133, at 259 (presenting a numerical example showing the buoying-up effect). There is some evidence that the
buoying-up effect may dominate the negative effect of the amendments. See Marcel Kahan & Bruce
Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes?, 66 J. BUS. 499 (1993) (offering such
evidence).
273
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payment terms of an issue of bonds. CACs have long been a standard
contractual term for sovereign bonds issued under U.K. law. Sovereign bonds
governed by U.S. law have, however, traditionally contained UACs, which
require all creditors to consent to amendments of the payment terms. Because
under a UAC a majority of the holders cannot force minority holders to accept
the terms of a proposed restructuring, the minority creditors may hold out from
the restructuring, even if it is in the best interests of the bondholders. CACs
constrain this “tyranny of the minority”277 by enabling the holdouts to be
overridden by a majority or supermajority vote. In addition to addressing the
collective action problem, CACs address the coordination problem caused by
the fact that an increasing percentage of sovereign debt is held by dispersed
public investors.
A variety of participants in the sovereign debt market have endorsed
encouraging or requiring the universal substitution of CACs for UACs in new
bond issues.278 The advantages of CACs are straightforward. Once a
sovereign debtor reaches agreement with a majority or supermajority of the
holders of an issue of its bonds, the bonds can be restructured despite the
objections, or refusal to participate, of minority holders. The negotiated terms
bind all the holders. Thus, CACs lessen the problem of creditor coordination
by allowing the debtor to negotiate with representatives of a majority or
supermajority of the bondholders. In addition, CACs reduce the holdout
problem by enabling a majority of the holders to force a restructuring upon a
recalcitrant minority.
Commentators first defend CACs as a contractual approach that avoids the
shortcomings of a more intrusive regulatory solution.279 Indeed, supporters
argue that, by solving the collective action problem and reducing the risk of
holdouts, CACs should raise the value of debt.280 Although some have argued
that CACs may create a moral hazard problem for sovereign debtors by
reducing the difficulty of restructurings, recent empirical evidence indicates
that the market does not view CACs as less attractive than UACs.281 This
277

Id. at 1336.
See, e.g., Under Secretary of Treasury John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S.
Perspective, Remarks at the Conference on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards?, Institute for
International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002) (endorsing the use of CACs), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm.
279 Id.
280 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14 (explaining the basis for this argument).
281 See, e.g., Torbjörn Becker et al., Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action
Clauses Costly?, 61 J. INT’L ECON. 127 (2003); Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and
278
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suggests that creditors do not anticipate that the use of CACs will increase the
likelihood of opportunistic defaults.
Attempting to reform the restructuring process through the universal use of
CACs, however, has several disadvantages. CACs only enable the majority of
creditors of a given issue to restructure that particular issue of bonds. They do
not permit holders of one issue of bonds to force holders of another to accept
the terms of a restructuring. They neither require that all issues be restructured
nor deal with potential problems of unfairness among holders of different
issues. Thus, while CACs may work effectively to change the terms of a
single issue of bonds, or perhaps a limited number of issues,282 they offer little
help in dealing with coordination and collective action problems in a country
like Argentina, which is attempting to restructure 152 different bond issues
involving seven different currencies and the governing laws of eight different
countries.283 Moreover, the insertion of CACs into new issues of bonds does
not address concerns regarding existing bonds, including the Argentine bonds,
that contain UACs. Due to the long-term nature of sovereign bonds, the full
utility of CACs would not be realized until a considerable point in the future.
Moreover, CACs may replace the tyranny of the minority with a tyranny of
the majority. In particular, CACs create the risk that majority bondholders will
deal unfairly with the minority. Although some commentators have argued
that the majority’s decision to restructure is constrained by the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,284 it is not clear what content this
doctrine has in limiting the right of any particular bondholder to base its voting
decision exclusively on its own financial interests. Notably, in a recent
decision evaluating the duties of majority creditors in negotiating in
accordance with a CAC, a British court specifically found that majority
creditors had no obligation to negotiate on behalf of all creditors rather than in
their own self interest.285 The court explained: “By signing up at the outset,
each lender submits to the decision of the majority lenders at important forks in
Collective Action Clauses, FIN. STABILITY REV., June 2000, at 142; Anthony Richards & Mark Gugiatti, Do
Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6 INT’L FIN. 415
(2003); Kostas Tsatsaronis, The Effect of Collective Action Clauses on Sovereign Bond Yields, BIS Q. REV.,
Nov. 1999, at 22.
282 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417, 422-23 (2003)
(observing that the value of CACs is limited to their ability to change the terms of a single class of debt).
283 Guillermo Nielsen, Secretary of Finance of Argentina, Remarks in Dubai 14 (Sept. 22, 2003), at
http://www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/documentos/discurso_gn_dubai_con_diap_english.pdf.
284 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14.
285 Redwood Master Fund, Ltd. v. TD Bank Eur. Ltd., [2002] All E.R. (D) 41 (Dec) (Ch. 2002).
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the road.”286 The problem of heterogeneous bondholder interest exacerbates
the risk of unfairness to some bondholders.
CACs are a contractual term, and so their inclusion must be acceptable to
bondholders and sovereign debtors. The Treasury Department, the IMF, and
other participants have argued for the use of CACs in all new issues of bonds,
reasoning that CACs have not impaired the marketability of bonds that contain
them. Yet, bondholders and sovereign debtors have not demanded this
solution to the holdout problem on their own. Despite the official
encouragement, only a small percentage of sovereign bonds, particularly
emerging market bonds, contains CACs.287
Finally, CACs do not eliminate the strategic use of litigation, the stated
goal of their inclusion in debt instruments. Unless and until courts develop a
jurisprudence clarifying the rights and responsibilities of creditor groups in
restructurings, holdout creditors will continue to enforce their claims against
sovereign debtors in courts. In addition to holdout litigation, CACs may
spawn a new class of intercreditor suits as dissenting bondholders challenge
the restructuring terms imposed by the majority or supermajority of
bondholders. Indeed, the uncertainty associated with judicial review of all
these claims may offer a partial explanation for the failure of the market to
attribute greater value to bonds subject to CACs.
3. The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
Of the various proposals for some form of sovereign bankruptcy procedure,
the one that has attracted the most attention is the proposal by Dr. Krueger.288
In its most recent form, the SDRM would create a process by which a majority
of creditors could negotiate a restructuring that would then be binding upon all
creditors.289 The advantages of the SDRM over the universal use of CACs
include the SDRM’s ability to deal with multiple issues of bonds and its
286

Id. at 27.
Yan Liu, Int’l Monetary Fund, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds 23 (Aug.
30, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/liu.pdf. For recent
examinations of this phenomenon, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition
in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 (2004); Stephen Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929
(2004); and Int’l Monetary Fund, Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts―Encouraging
Greater Use (June 2002), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602a.pdf.
288 See Int’l Monetary Fund, Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM): A Fact
Sheet, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm (Jan. 2003).
289 Id.
287
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applicability to existing debt, including bonds issued with UACs.
While Dr. Krueger and the IMF continue to develop the SDRM, the basic
procedure would place primary responsibility for negotiating restructurings in
the hands of creditors.290 Practically speaking, the SDRM is more of a
workout mechanism than an international bankruptcy court. The SDRM would
group creditors into a single class that would have the power to restructure all
debt subject to the SDRM (domestic debt would not be included) by vote of a
qualified majority of the class.291 A judge or some type of official would
resolve disputes among creditors but, unlike the bankruptcy process, the judge
would not evaluate the substantive terms of the restructuring for fairness.292 A
restructuring negotiated by the supermajority of creditors would be binding on
all creditors subject to the restructuring.
Importantly, the proposal does not include a standstill or a stay on creditor
enforcement of claims through litigation.293 This reflects a change from earlier
IMF proposals. Instead, the proposal provides that disruptive litigation will be
discouraged through the application of the so-called “Hotchpot rule,” whereby
any amounts received by a creditor through litigation will be deducted from
that creditor’s approved claim under the restructuring agreement.294 Although
application of this rule would reduce the incentive for some litigation, it would
not affect litigation by creditors who are able to obtain a greater recovery
through litigation than through the restructuring.295
A substantial limitation of the SDRM is its failure to address intercreditor
fairness in the restructuring process. The majority creditors are the ones who
have a seat at the negotiating table. The SDRM offers no formal procedure to
involve small or retail investors in the negotiations and, instead, offers a legal
mechanism designed to reduce their power vis-à-vis the majority. To the
extent that banks are the majority creditors, there are reasons to question their
ability to act as effective agents for the minority. Indeed, there are substantial
differences in creditor interests. Moreover, adoption of the SDRM would
290

Id.
Anne Krueger, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Messy or Messier?, AM. ECON. REV., May 2003, at 70,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/010403.htm.
292 Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 287.
293 Krueger, supra note 291, at 72.
294 Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 287.
295 See Kunibert Raffer, To Stay or Not to Stay―A Short Note on Differing Versions of the SDRM (Jan.
31, 2003) (demonstrating the effect of the Hotchpot rule through numerical examples), available at http://
www.jubileeplus.org/latest/raffer310103.htm.
291
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affect the price of outstanding sovereign debt. In particular, uncertainties
about the implementation and operation of the SDRM are likely to reduce the
price of debt, adversely affecting existing creditors.
B. Benefits of Holdout Litigation
Each of the three proposals to reform the restructuring process ignores the
developments in the international capital markets and in legal doctrines that
have engendered litigation by holdout creditors. More importantly, the
proposals give short shrift to the positive effects of an enforcement remedy on
the restructuring process and the sovereign debt market.
Holdout litigation appears to be the product of developments in two
distinct, but related, spheres―the markets and the courts. As the sovereign
debt market has developed to include diverse creditors with differing
interests,296 the judiciary has developed an approach that narrowly interprets
the defenses asserted by sovereign debtors in suits brought by creditors.297
Thus, as the likelihood of recalcitrant creditors has increased, the ability of
these creditors to pursue their claims through litigation has also increased. The
restructuring process, however, has not advanced to reflect these
developments.
In the restructurings of the 1930s,298 the bondholder committees, including
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, lacked both the authority to bind
bondholders to agreements with sovereign debtors and an effective means of
pressuring recalcitrant bondholders to accept restructuring plans that had been
negotiated with debtors. In addition, holdout creditors were unable to pursue
their claims against sovereign debtors in court. As a result, restructurings were
completed only over the course of long periods of time, causing additional
distress for sovereign debtors as well as losses for bondholders. Ultimately,
these difficulties led to the collapse of the market for sovereign bonds.
In the restructurings of the 1980s,299 the bank advisory committees were
able to pressure recalcitrant banks, generally smaller commercial banks, to
assent to proposed restructuring plans and to refrain from litigating their
claims. The terms of these plans, however, tended to favor the interests of the

296
297
298
299

These developments are discussed supra in Part I.B. and Part I.C.
The development of this approach is discussed supra in Part II.
These restructurings are discussed supra in Part I.B.1.
These restructurings are discussed supra in Part I.B.2.
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large commercial banks over the interests of the smaller commercial banks,
creating a tyranny of the majority. Moreover, the perception among the
smaller banks that their interests were subsumed to the interests of the large
banks created strains among the banks participating in the restructurings. The
tensions led to the development of a secondary market for sovereign debt, and
they may have also contributed to the reduction in the availability of loans to
sovereign debtors.
For current and future restructurings, holdout litigation may provide a
means of avoiding the failures evident in the restructurings of 1930s and the
1980s by allowing creditors to enforce their claims against sovereign debtors.
If creditors can use lawsuits to challenge the terms of proposed restructuring
plans, sovereign debtors may be limited in their ability to delay the completion
of the restructuring process. Similarly, holdout litigation offers a mechanism
by which minority creditors can challenge restructurings designed principally
for the benefit of the majority of the creditors.
Holdout litigation may also indirectly introduce efficiencies into the
restructuring process. By permitting recalcitrant creditors to reject the terms of
a proposed restructuring plan, including a plan supported by a majority of the
other creditors, and to pursue successfully their claims against the sovereign
debtor in court, holdout litigation may entice vulture funds to enter the
sovereign debt market.300 To the extent vulture funds purchase significant
blocks of claims, they may reduce the administrative burden associated with
restructuring sovereign debt. By aggregating claims, vulture funds may serve
as a forum for coordinating the actions of creditors, especially among the
creditors who sell their claims to the funds.301 At the same time, vulture funds
may also provide a mechanism through which communications and
300

For example, in describing Elliott’s decision to purchase a portion of Peru’s distressed debt, one
commentator noted that “[t]he team at Elliott examined the situation, determined that Peru was getting away
with paying banks rather less than it ought, and held out for a better deal. They also, of course, judged their
chances of being able to win a court case against a sovereign.” Felix Salmon, Elliott Associates’ Aggression
Captures Low-Risk Returns, EUROMONEY, Feb. 2004, at 36.
301 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1253-54 (noting the coordinating role of vulture funds in the
context of exchange offers for corporate bonds that are coupled with exit consents); see also ROSENBERG,
supra note 130, at 25-36 (describing the role of vulture funds in reducing the administrative burden associated
with corporate reorganizations); Yap, supra note 255, at 219 (same). This aggregation function may, in many
ways, be similar to the role of select investors in aggregating claims in class action lawsuits, particularly those
involving securities fraud. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench:
Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1250-52 (discussing the role of class
action lawsuits in general, and lead plaintiffs in particular, in aggregating claims in cases involving securities
fraud).
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negotiating costs may be reduced.302
In addition to improving the restructuring process, holdout litigation may
enhance the operation of the sovereign debt market. Specifically, holdout
litigation may serve as a potential check on opportunistic defaults by sovereign
debtors. If sovereign debtors expect that creditors, especially recalcitrant
creditors, will enforce their claims through litigation, then they may be less
likely to default when they are able to make the payments required on their
debts. By reducing the probability of opportunistic defaults, holdout litigation
may increase capital flows. Indeed, participants in the sovereign debt market
appear to value judicial enforcement of debt claims. In Allied Bank, for
example, the Clearing House supported the efforts of a single commercial bank
to enforce its claims against Costa Rica, even though the litigation had the
effect of disrupting the proposed restructuring plan.303 Recent developments in
the interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments
provide further evidence that creditors, and even sovereign debtors, value the
curb that holdout litigation imposes on opportunistic defaults.304 Despite
widespread expressions of concern regarding the court’s interpretation of this
clause in Elliott’s suit against Peru,305 the court’s decision did not result in
changes to the language of pari passu clauses contained in new debt
instruments to remove the power the interpretation gives to holdout creditors
so as to render the decision ineffective.306 Instead, as Stephen Choi and Mitu
Gulati show, “the change that came was . . . the elevation of the importance of
the [clause] . . . [a]s . . . in all but three of the new [debt] contracts, the vote
required to change the pari passu [clause] was elevated from a 50% or 66.67%

302 Any reduction in the administrative burden of the restructuring process resulting from the
consolidation of claims of many creditors, however, may be overshadowed by the costs incurred as a result of
any litigation that the vulture funds pursue in respect of the purchased claims. See Vultures the Truly Evil
Face of Capitalism, SUN. TRIB. (Ireland), May 12, 2002, at 9 (discussing the role of legal fees in sovereign debt
restructurings).
303 This litigation is discussed supra Part II.
304 Recall that in connection with Elliott’s suit against Peru, a Brussels court interpreted the pari passu
clause in the letter agreements Elliott purchased as precluding Peru from making a payment on its Brady
Bonds without making a pro rata payment to Elliott. The decision caused Peru to settle the case by making a
substantial payment to Elliott.
305 See G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 638 (2000) (describing
the interpretation as putting “a large hammer in the hands of holdout creditors, thereby enabling them to cause
even more disruption in restructurings”). In fact, holdout creditors relied on the interpretation of the clause in
pursuing their claims against sovereign debtors in courts located not only in Brussels but also in California,
New York, and London. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 240, at 877-79 (summarizing the status of the
litigation).
306 Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 993.
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vote threshold to the heightened 75% or 85% threshold.”307 The effort by
creditors, and perhaps sovereign debtors, to preserve the availability of holdout
litigation in the face of uncertainty may be particularly valuable in the context
of the sovereign debt market in which other constraints on opportunistic
defaults appear to operate poorly. In particular, a sovereign debtor’s reputation
may be of limited importance as, although the empirical evidence is mixed,
studies indicate that a sovereign debtor’s reputation for repayment has little
effect on its ability to borrow.308
Holdout litigation may also increase the liquidity of the market for
sovereign debt. By serving as a catalyst for vulture funds to purchase
distressed sovereign debt, holdout litigation draws active participants into the
market. These funds create liquidity for other investors by offering them a
means of exiting the market for a fixed sum of money.309 Retail investors,
notably those with fixed incomes, may benefit from the ability to monetize
their claims.310 At the same time, these transactions provide information
regarding prices that banks and other institutional investors require to mark
their portfolios to market.311 Moreover, even if these creditors do not wish to
307 Id. at 994. As Professor Choi and Professor Gulati explain, “the pari passu [clause] that no one seems
to understand and that provided for a heightened risk of holdouts, instead of getting clarified or eliminated in
the new [debt] contracts, got elevated, thereby further increasing the risk of holdouts!” Id.
308 Upon completing their study of the experiences with sovereign debt for a period over one hundred
years, Peter Lindert and Peter Morton conclude that “investors seem to pay little attention to the past
repayment record of [sovereign debtors]. . . . [T]hey do not punish governments with a prior default history,
undercutting the belief in a penalty that compels faithful repayment.” Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, How
Sovereign Debt Has Worked, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 102,
at 39, 40; see also Eliana A. Cardoso & Rudiger Dornbusch, Brazilian Debt Crisis: Past and Present, in THE
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 19, at 106 (finding an absence of
reputation effects in the sovereign debt market); Barry Eichengreen, Historical Research on International
Lending and Debt, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 160-62 (1991) (concluding that reputation effects have limited
impact in the market for sovereign debt); Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 106 (same). But see Sule
Ozler, Have Commercial Banks Ignored History?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 608 (finding evidence of reputation
effects in the sovereign debt market); Michael Tomz, How Do Reputations Form?: New and Seasoned
Borrowers in International Capital Markets (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (same), available at
http://www.stanford. edu/~tomz/working/apsa01.pdf.
309 Absent this option, the investors, like bondholders during the restructurings of the 1930s and the
smaller commercial banks during the early years of the restructurings of the 1980s, must hold their claims
through the completion of the restructuring. See, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading
Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the role
of vulture funds in providing liquidity in the market for distressed corporate debt); Vulture Hunt, FIN. TIMES,
May 7, 2002, at 20 (arguing that vulture funds provide liquidity in the market for sovereign debt).
310 Although these investors may be loath to sell their sovereign bonds at a loss, their financial positions
may require them to sell the bonds to generate cash for immediate expenses. See Lapper, supra note 135
(noting the difficult position of retail investors who purchased sovereign bonds issued by Argentina).
311 See S. Richard Orzy, Secondary Market Players: Vultures or Value Enhancers?, 20 NAT’L
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litigate their claims against sovereign debtors, they may still obtain value from
the litigation remedy by selling their holdings of sovereign debt to other
investors that are more inclined toward litigation.
C. Tools for Managing Holdout Litigation
While protecting the ability of holdout creditors to enforce their claims
against sovereign debtors through litigation enhances the restructuring process
and the sovereign debt market, holdout litigation has the capacity to disrupt
restructurings. The extent of the disruption is unclear.312 Uncertainty
regarding the relative benefits and cost of holdout litigation, and the role of the
litigation option in future restructurings, calls for an incremental approach to
reform.313 Rather than broad proposals designed to apply to all sovereign
debtors and all restructuring plans, limited reform efforts specifically tailored
to the scope of the litigation remedy and the potential for abuse of the remedy
are likely to have the greatest success in resolving the tensions created by
holdout litigation. Instead of exchange offers coupled with exit consents,
universal CACs, or the SDRM, we argue for relatively modest changes to the
terms of sovereign debt instruments that would directly affect the ability of
investors to pursue holdout litigation.
Focusing on the terms contained in debt instruments that are governed by
INSOLVENCY REV. 1, 9-10 (2003) (describing the importance of bid and ask prices in indicating the value of
distressed corporate debt), available at 2003 C.N.I.R. LEXIS 1.
312 On the one hand, Dr. Krueger has argued that holdout litigation so adversely impacts the restructuring
process as to require the implementation of the SDRM to limit, or perhaps eliminate, holdout litigation.
Krueger, New Approach, supra note 3. At the other end of the spectrum, Andrei Shleifer has argued that, by
limiting the potential for holdout litigation and thereby weakening the rights of creditors, the SDRM will
aggravate existing problems in the restructuring process. ANDREI SHLEIFER, WILL THE SOVEREIGN DEBT
MARKET SURVIVE? (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2000, 2003), available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2003papers/2003list. html. Between these two poles, commentators
have argued that “nearly a decade after it first became the focus of policy and academic attention, the holdout
problem has all but failed to materialize.” Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign
Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1119, 1143-44 (2004); see also Roubini, supra note 11, at 7 (identifying ten
reasons “why the holdout problem is not a big problem in practice,” including the desire of creditors, even
vulture funds, to avoid the costs of litigation and the availability of side payments, or bribes, to remove the
incentive to hold out).
313 In addition, the balance between the benefits and the costs of holdout litigation is likely to vary from
case to case, depending upon the characteristics of the sovereign debtor. Sovereign debtors with relatively
good prospects for stable growth may benefit from demonstrating a strong commitment to satisfy the
obligations imposed by their debts. By subjecting themselves to a substantial risk of holdout litigation, these
debtors may signal to creditors that they will refrain from defaulting opportunistically. Other sovereign
debtors, those with poor outlooks for growth, may do better to direct their efforts to minimizing the likelihood
of holdout litigation as a means of reducing the costs associated with restructurings of their debts.

1106

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

New York law, we argue that sovereign debtors could readily offer bonds for
which the threat of disruptive holdout litigation is constrained. Modifying
these debt instruments in accordance with our suggestions would limit the
prospect of harmful litigation while retaining the availability of the litigation
remedy in cases of overreaching by either the majority of the bondholders or
the sovereign debtor. Moreover, the extent to which investors demand higher
interest rates to purchase these bonds would provide a means of measuring the
extent to which investors value the litigation option. The value of our
suggestions, then, could be tested directly in the sovereign debt market.
What type of modifications to fiscal agency agreements do we suggest?
We first identify changes that are designed to reduce the power of bondholders
to act individually. We next consider the designation of a representative,
perhaps in the form of a trustee, to assist the bondholders in acting as a group.
We then discuss refinements to limit the diversity among bondholders.
Finally, we consider explicit enforcement rights for minority bondholders in
the event of discriminatory treatment in connection with a default or a
restructuring of the bonds.
Most sovereign bonds issued in the United States are issued pursuant to a
fiscal agency agreement.314 The agreement governs the relationship between
the sovereign debtor and the fiscal agent, which is typically the investment
bank, perhaps in connection with one of its affiliates, serving as lead
underwriter for the offering of the bonds.315 The fiscal agent is the agent of the
sovereign debtor, as issuer of the bonds.316 The agreement also governs the
terms of the bonds.
The fiscal agent does not act for the bondholders. As a result, the
bondholders typically retain the power to act individually in the event of a
default on the bonds. The individual actions can include accelerating the
principal amount of the bonds and suing to collect for breach of the
agreement.317 Each bondholder has the right, upon the occurrence of an event
of default, to demand payment of the full principal amount of its bonds and to
file suit against the sovereign debtor to collect the payment.
314

Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 275, at 1332.
Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 342.
316 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 275, at 1332.
317 See id. at 1330-32 (describing acceleration clauses and enforcement restrictions in sovereign debt
instruments). Acceleration of the principal amount of all the bonds typically requires the vote of holders of at
least twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds, measured in terms of the principal amount of the bonds. Id.
at 1330.
315
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This structure differs markedly from the rights provided to bondholders
pursuant to a trust indenture.318 Specifically, under the terms of a trust
indenture, individual bondholders do not have the right to accelerate the
principal amounts of their bonds. Instead, each bondholder has the right to file
suit against the debtor only for payments of interest and principal that are not
made on their respective due dates.319 The trustee, as agent for the
bondholders, possesses the right to accelerate the principal amount of all the
bonds and to sue the debtor for the total amount.320
To limit the incentives of bondholders to commence disruptive litigation,
sovereign debtors might modify the terms of the fiscal agency agreements
pursuant to which they issue bonds to eliminate the right of individual
bondholders to accelerate the principal amounts of their bonds in the event of a
default. Rather than retaining the right to demand payment for the entire
principal amount of its bonds, each bondholder might be limited to the right to
sue the sovereign debtor only for unpaid interest and principal. This
modification would reduce the attractiveness of holdout litigation by sharply
limiting the size of the judgment potentially available to a bondholder while
simultaneously increasing the expense of pursuing the claim. In Elliott
Associates,321 Elliott’s ability to accelerate the principal amount of its letter
agreements allowed it to obtain a judgment against Peru for over $55 million,
creating a strong incentive to pursue the claim it had purchased for
approximately $11 million. If, as we suggest, the claim were limited to unpaid
interest (and, of course, principal at maturity), a bondholder would have
relatively weak incentives to pursue holdout litigation. Moreover, the
necessity of bringing multiple suits for each missed interest payment over an
extended period of years would increase the burden of the litigation relative to
318 As Mr. Buchheit and Professor Gulati note, this convention also differs from the rights provided to
bondholders under trust deeds, which are commonly used in the United Kingdom. Trust deeds provide that
only the trustee has the power to enforce the instrument. Individual bondholders do not have the right to file
suit against the sovereign debtor unless the trustee, having been instructed by holders of a specified percentage
of the outstanding bonds, fails to commence an enforcement action. Moreover, any recoveries made by the
trustee must be shared pro rata among the bondholders. Id. at 1331.
319 Id. at 1331-32; see also Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between
Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1049-50 (2002) (noting that “[t]his right is
unqualified and may thus be exercised independently by any holder regardless of whether the trustee or the
other bondholders approve of such suit”).
320 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 275, at 1332. Individual bondholders recover the right to sue for the
total amount of the bonds in the event the trustee, having been instructed by the holders of at least twenty-five
percent of the outstanding bonds and offered satisfactory indemnification, fails to commence an enforcement
action within a specified period of time, typically sixty days. Id.
321 This case is discussed supra Part II.
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its expected benefits.
In addition, the ability of bondholders to act on their own might be limited
by modifying the terms of the agreements to require the affirmative vote of a
designated percentage of the outstanding bonds to commence any litigation on
behalf of any bondholder.322 For example, the approval of the holders of at
least twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds, measured in terms of
principal amount, might be required before a bondholder would be permitted to
file suit against the sovereign debtor. The required threshold for commencing
litigation need not, of course, be the same as the requirement for accelerating
the principal amounts of all the bonds. Thus, for instance, a vulture fund might
acquire twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds by purchasing them at
deep discounts from their face values in the secondary market and thereby
satisfy the requirement for acceleration. Yet, if the required threshold for
commencing litigation were thirty-five percent, the fund would not be able to
pursue the claim by filing suit against the sovereign debtor in court.323
Regardless of the nature of the claim, and regardless of the particular
proportion of the outstanding bonds designated as necessary to commence
litigation, the requirement of securing the affirmative vote of the holders of a
specified percentage of the outstanding bonds will impose delays on, and
increase the expense of, suits against the sovereign debtor. These obstacles
reduce the attractiveness of the litigation remedy as well as the likelihood that
bondholders will undertake litigation that is disruptive to the restructuring
process and harmful to other creditors. In particular, they lower the chance
that nuisance litigation will be a profitable undertaking. Significantly, in
addition to reducing the attractiveness of litigation, this modification may also
assist the bondholders in acting as a group as collective action among the
bondholders would, in almost all circumstances, be necessary to accelerate the
principal amounts of the bonds and to commence litigation against the
sovereign debtor. Actions taken as a group may reduce concerns regarding
differential treatment of bondholders and disruption of the restructuring
process. In particular, the requirement of group action would alleviate the
concern that, by initiating litigation, holdout creditors were seeking to “jump
the line.”

322

04.

For a discussion of a similar proposal, see Macmillan, Debt Work-Out System, supra note 28, at 103-

323 Alternatively, the agreement might provide a higher threshold for acceleration—preserving an
individual bondholder’s access to the courts but limiting the power of the litigation remedy.
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A similar coordination of bondholder interests could be achieved by issuing
sovereign bonds pursuant to trust indentures, rather than fiscal agency
agreements. A trust indenture provides for a trustee to serve as the agent for
the bondholders, rather than for a fiscal agent to serve as the agent of the
sovereign debtor. Although the duties of a trustee are limited, they are not
inconsequential,324 and they are enhanced upon the occurrence of default on
the bonds.325 Typically, only the trustee is entitled to accelerate the principal
amounts of the bonds and to file suit against the debtor. Absent a failure on the
part of the trustee, the bondholders are limited in the claims they may bring
against the debtor. In this way, the use of a trust indenture, and a trustee, limits
the scope of the litigation option for individual bondholders while preserving
the viability of litigation to enforce the obligations of the debtor.326
In addition, by providing for a trustee to serve as the agent for the
bondholders, a trust indenture may reduce incentives to pursue holdout
litigation by limiting the funds available to satisfy judgments against the
debtor. Because the trustee serves the interests of the bondholders, and not the
debtor, the transfer to the trustee by the debtor of funds for payment on the
bonds may remove the funds from the scope of a judgment against the debtor.
This result differs from the consequences of transferring funds to a fiscal agent,
which may not be sufficient to avoid the reach of attachment orders. In Elliott
Associates,327 for example, Elliott sought to enforce its judgment against Peru
in respect of its letter agreements by seeking to attach funds for the payment of
interest on the Brady Bonds that Peru was to transfer to the fiscal agent for the
Brady Bonds.328 In pursuing this strategy, Elliott argued that the funds would
324 As long as no default on the bonds has occurred, the trustee’s duties are limited to the duties that are
explicitly set forth in the trust indenture. As a general matter, these duties relate to the administration of the
trust indenture and the bonds: maintaining a register of the bondholders and authenticating the bonds. See AM.
BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 165-68, 181, 247-50 (1971) (discussing the duties of the
trustee).
325 Upon the occurrence of an event of default, the trustee’s duties expand, requiring it to exercise the
rights and powers granted to it under the trust indenture and to use the same degree of care and skill in their
exercise as a prudent person would under the same circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs. Id. at 24950 (discussing the duties of the trustee upon the occurrence of an event of default).
326 Note that the fees paid to the trustee for its services, which are the responsibility of the debtor, are
likely to be significantly less than the costs incurred as a consequence of any holdout litigation. The annual
fee for a trustee is typically quite modest, while the cost of defending a suit (even a nuisance suit) brought by a
recalcitrant bondholder can be substantial. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATE
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 456 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the selection criteria for trustees as including
competence in ministerial tasks and low fees); Vultures the Truly Evil Face of Capitalism, supra note 302.
327 This case is discussed supra Part II.
328 See Eric Lindenbaum & Alicia Duran, Debt Restructuring: Legal Considerations, MERRILL LYNCH
EMERGING MARKETS RES., Oct. 2000, at 3 (describing Elliott’s efforts to enforce its judgment against Peru),
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remain the property of Peru even after transfer to the fiscal agent, as the fiscal
agent was Peru’s agent.329 If the Brady Bonds had been issued under a trust
indenture, then the funds would have been transferred to a trustee, an agent of
the bondholders, and Elliott’s enforcement strategy may not have been
successful.330
Rather than simply adopting the standard terms of trust indentures, which
impose limited duties on, and grant few rights to, trustees, trust indentures for
sovereign bonds might be structured to impose significant responsibilities on
trustees and to grant them corresponding powers.331 The trustee, for instance,
could be charged with pursuing all claims of the bondholders against the
sovereign debtor. The trustee would thus have the obligation and the authority
to commence all litigation on behalf of the bondholders, including suits for
unpaid interest and principal on the bonds and suits for the total principal
amount of all the bonds upon acceleration. In this way, the trustee would hold
the power of the litigation remedy for the benefit of all the bondholders. At the
same time, the bondholders would lack the ability to engage in litigation that is
disruptive to the restructuring process and harmful to other creditors.
The trustee could also be empowered to represent the bondholders in any
restructuring of the bonds. One possibility would limit the trustee’s authority
to participating in negotiations with the sovereign debtor regarding the terms of
the restructuring and then recommending proposed restructuring terms to the
bondholders for their ratification. Alternatively, the trustee’s authority might
extend to modifying the terms of the bonds without the consent of the
bondholders; that is, the trustee might be authorized to negotiate the terms of a
restructuring of the bonds with the sovereign debtor and to accept those terms
on behalf of the bondholders, without involving the bondholders in the
restructuring process.332 The trustee might also be designated as the
available at http://www.emta.org/keyper/linden1.pdf.
329 Id. Elliott served a restraining order on the fiscal agent, with the intent of attaching the funds upon
transfer to the agent. To avoid the attachment, and a default on the Brady Bonds, Peru settled the case by
making a substantial payment to Elliott and then paid the interest on the Brady Bonds. Id.
330 The use of a trustee, rather than a fiscal agent, does not, however, guarantee that funds transferred in
respect to the bonds will be protected from attachment. Id.
331 In the context of corporate bonds, Yakov Amihud and others have proposed the creation of a
“supertrustee” with substantial duties and powers, including those related to the enforcement and the
renegotiation of the terms of the indenture. Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate
Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1999).
332 The trust indenture could, however, reserve to the bondholders the right to reject the restructuring
terms implemented through the actions of the trustee. Any terms negotiated and accepted by the trustee might
be overturned within a specified period of time, for example forty-five days, upon the vote of a supermajority
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representative of the bondholders on any committee of bondholders that is
formed in connection with a restructuring of the bonds.333
In representing the bondholders, either in court or in the restructuring
process, the trustee would serve the interests of all bondholders, as the trustee
would be the agent of all the bondholders, appointed through the trust
indenture.334 Thus, the trustee would not be permitted to favor the interests of
one class of investors―banks and other institutional investors―over the
interests of another―retail investors.
Refinements to sovereign debt instruments could also limit heterogeneity
among the bondholders by limiting the class of potential holders. Prior to the
implementation of the Brady Plan, debt instruments often contained provisions
that were designed to limit the diversity among the class of debtholders by
precluding assignment of the debt to nonfinancial institutions. Although in
Pravin335 the court found that the relevant provision was not sufficiently
explicit to prohibit assignment to nonfinancial institutions, careful drafting
could easily create an enforceable restriction on assignability. Sovereign
debtors could thus sell their bonds to selected types of investors in the initial
offering, and then, through restrictive assignment provisions in the agreement
of the bondholders.
333 These committees may be appointed through the actions of the sovereign debtors, as was the case of
the bank advisory committees during the 1980s, or they may be formed by the bondholders themselves, as was
more typically the case during the restructurings of the 1930s. Regardless of the manner in which any
particular committee is organized, the trustee could be designated, under the terms of the trust indenture, as the
representative of the bondholders on all committees. This approach would minimize the costs of selecting a
representative of the bondholders, as no formal action of the bondholders would be necessary. In the current
crisis involving the restructuring of Argentina’s debt, for example, bondholders have organized a number of
committees, and they have also organized the committees into a “supercommittee,” the Global Committee of
Argentine Bondholders, which was formed in January of 2004 and represents over 500 institutional investors
and retail investor groups. See Argentina Creditors Unite to Speed Up Bond Talks, ANSA ENG. MEDIA
SERVICE, Jan. 12, 2004 (describing the creation of the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders); Don’t
Lie to Me, Argentina, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 15, 2004, at 7 (same).
334 Absent the imposition of fiduciary duties to serve the interests of bondholders, the trustee may not
provide an entirely robust check on low restructuring terms, because the trustee, while the agent of the
bondholders, is chosen by the debtor. Like the banks that sold sovereign bonds to investors in the 1920s, the
trustee may have incentives to serve the interests of the debtor over the interests of the bondholders. Similarly,
the trustee may not completely eliminate discriminatory restructuring terms. Trustees are typically banks, and
so they may, for the sake of business relationships, be inclined to favor the interests of banks over the interests
of other investors. As a result, the terms of the restructurings, like the terms of the restructurings in the 1980s,
may favor the interests of banks and other institutional investors. Nonetheless, trustees may seek to develop
reputations for acting in the interests of all the bondholders, and investors may be able to use the market to
pressure sovereign debtors to select these trustees. See Amihud et al., supra note 331, at 471-72, 484-85
(discussing similar issues in the context of supertrustees for corporate bonds).
335 This case is discussed supra in Part II.
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governing the bonds, limit the types of investors to whom the bonds could be
resold in the secondary market. In addition to the general category of
nonfinancial institutions, vulture funds or retail investors336 could be
specifically precluded from holding the bonds. Although limitations on
assignability would reduce the liquidity of the bonds, the limitations would
also reduce the range of interests that would be implicated in a restructuring,
facilitating creditor coordination and limiting the likelihood of disruptive and
harmful litigation.
Finally, the terms of fiscal agency agreements might be modified to provide
specific enforcement rights for bondholders that have been discriminated
against in the context of a default or restructuring.337 For example, in the case
in which a sovereign debtor fails to make a required payment to a portion of
the bondholders, the agreement might provide that the vote of holders of
twenty-five percent of only those bonds experiencing the default is necessary
to accelerate the principal of those bonds, rather than requiring the vote of
holders of twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds to accelerate the
principal on all the bonds.338 By adjusting the threshold required for
accelerating the unmatured principal on bonds in this way, this proposed
change would provide a means for aggrieved bondholders to enforce their
rights when the rights of other bondholders have not been infringed. At the
same time, the modification would also provide incentives for these
336 Some commentators have expressed particular concern regarding the use of class action lawsuits in the
restructuring process. The class action mechanism is a procedural tool to facilitate the litigation of claims in
which the interests of individual class members are small. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and
Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 55-56 (describing the role of class actions in facilitating the litigation of small
claims). Limiting the participation of small investors, particularly retail investors, in the sovereign debt market
is virtually guaranteed to eliminate the potential for class action litigation.
337 Marcel Kahan has proposed a similar modification to the trust indentures governing corporate bonds.
See Kahan, supra note 319, at 1074. These rights may provide a means for minority bondholders to protect
themselves from a tyranny of the majority, and this protection may be particularly important in the absence of
judicial enforcement of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing among bondholders in sovereign
debt restructurings. Specifically, these rights may provide some explicit protections for minority creditors,
obviating the need to rely on the courts to recognize and enforce intercreditor duties. For a discussion of the
problems associated with the reliance on contract terms, as well as the significance of duties among holders of
sovereign debt, see Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14.
338 As Professor Kahan notes, if

only a subset of holders is affected directly by the [debtor’s] action, the threshold requirement
becomes harder to meet. If the threshold―say, holders of 25% of the outstanding bonds―was
reasonable assuming that the rights of all bondholders were affected, it can become oppressive if
the affected subset holds only 40% or 20% of the outstanding bonds.
Kahan, supra note 319, at 1075.
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bondholders to take action, by commencing litigation, to limit the strategic
actions of the sovereign debtor and the majority of the bondholders.
These modest refinements to sovereign debt instruments, particularly fiscal
agency agreements, are likely to provide an effective means of reducing the
costs engendered by holdout litigation while facilitating the restructuring
process and promoting the functioning of the international capital markets.
Rather than requiring extensive changes throughout the market for sovereign
debt, these reforms can be tailored to the circumstances of individual sovereign
debtors.
Importantly, these reforms can be tested in the market. Once the modified
terms are incorporated in agreements governing bonds issued by different
sovereign debtors, we will be able to observe their effect on the incidence of
holdout litigation. In particular, we will be able to observe whether the
modified terms appear to limit disruptive litigation in sovereign bond
restructurings. Moreover, we will be able to observe the effect of the modified
terms on the prices of sovereign bonds. The resulting prices will indicate the
value investors attribute to the modified terms and, indirectly, to the role of
holdout litigation. If including terms that reduce the availability of litigation in
a sovereign debt instrument results in the bonds bearing a higher interest rate
than similar bonds that are not subject to the terms, the difference in interest
rates would support the argument that holdout litigation provides value to
investors. This evidence that the possibility of investors enforcing their rights
through litigation adds value to sovereign bonds would suggest that
enforcement rights should not be eliminated without careful analysis. In
contrast, the failure of investors to demand a premium to purchase bonds
subject to terms limiting the ability of holders to accelerate the principal
amounts of the bonds or to initiate litigation against the sovereign debtor
would suggest that investors view these actions as strategic behavior by
holdout creditors and not as enhancing the value of the bonds.339
Despite the benefits of these modest reforms, sovereign debtors may adopt
the modified terms we suggest only over an extended period of time, if they
adopt them at all. Participants in the sovereign debt market may view the
possibility of holdout litigation under existing debt instruments as valuable for
both the restructuring process and the market itself, and so they may perceive
reforms designed to limit this possibility as unnecessary or inappropriate.
339 This result would be similar to the evidence indicating that bonds subject to CACs do not appear to
trade at substantial discounts to similar bonds containing UACs. These studies are identified supra note 281.
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Moreover, frictions in the market may delay the modification of existing terms
in sovereign debt instruments. For example, participants in the sovereign debt
market may have a strong preference for standard terms, not only across
sovereign bonds issued by the same sovereign debtor but also across all
sovereign bonds.340 To the extent a sovereign debtor elects to include a new
term, including one of the modifications we propose, in an agreement
governing an issue of bonds, the debtor will incur costs in both drafting the
term and in marketing the bonds with the new term to investors.341 These costs
may be sufficiently large to deter the introduction of new terms, particularly in
cases in which the benefits of the new term are uncertain. Moreover, attorneys
who represent sovereign debtors and attorneys who represent underwriters,
play a mediating role in determining the terms to be included in an agreement
governing an issue of bonds.342 The attorneys may, despite the interests of
their clients, be reluctant to negotiate, prepare, and implement new terms in the
agreement as the costs to the attorneys are likely to be significantly greater
than the benefits to the attorneys.343 In fact, while limited, the available
340 Some commentators, particularly legal scholars, have analyzed the preference for standard terms
within the context of a bias in favor of the status quo. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 347, 359-62 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence] (analyzing the relevance of
behavioral biases, including the status quo bias, for the persistence of standard contract terms); Russell
Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and
Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998) (analyzing the role of standard terms in form contracts in creating
a bias among contracting parties for the status quo). Legal scholars have also analyzed this preference within
the framework of network effects among terms in agreements, particularly agreements governing bonds. See
Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 587-90 (1995)
(describing the role of standardization in facilitating the evaluation of complex terms in bonds); Marcel Kahan
& Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation]
(analyzing the role of learning externalities and network externalities in contributing to the standardization of
terms in corporate contracts); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (analyzing the role of network externalities in determining terms in corporate
contracts).
341 See Klausner, supra note 340, at 782-86 (analyzing the importance of legal services network effects
and marketing network effects in determining corporate contract terms). Robert Ahdieh has argued that legal
services network effects may be particularly significant in the context of sovereign debt instruments and that
marketing network effects may be the most important factor in influencing the preference for standard terms in
sovereign debt instruments. Ahdieh, supra note 287, at 718-21.
342 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 948, 974-80 (analyzing the role of attorneys in determining the
terms contained in sovereign debt instruments, particularly standard terms); Kahan & Klausner, Path
Dependence, supra note 340, at 353-58 (analyzing the importance of attorneys in determining the terms
contained in corporate contracts, particularly standard terms).
343 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 995-96 (describing the incentives of attorneys to favor standard
terms in sovereign debt instruments); Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 340, at 353-58
(describing the reasons attorneys may favor standard terms in corporate contracts despite the interests of their
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empirical evidence indicates that the preference for standardized terms retards
the adoption of new terms in sovereign debt instruments and that attorneys
play an important role in preserving the status quo in sovereign debt
instruments.344
Finally, even if sovereign debtors were to modify their debt instruments in
the manner we suggest, our approach is not without limitations. First, the
utility of our approach depends upon the capacity of the sovereign debt market
to price a variety of closely-related contractual terms. To the extent the market
is not able to price these terms accurately―through the interest rate borne by
the bonds or the discounts from principal amounts reflected in trading
prices―our approach is of limited use. Yet, we expect that the market for
sovereign debt is reasonably efficient. In addition, our proposal limits the
ability of sovereign debtors to rely on contractual uncertainty in an effort to
prevent the market from fully pricing the risks associated with clarification of
the scope of litigation rights. Our proposal thus serves to enhance the
efficiency of the sovereign debt market.
Second, the reforms we suggest are designed to balance the power of
bondholders relative to sovereign debtors and the power of minority
bondholders relative to the majority of the bondholders. The modifications we
propose may not strike the appropriate balance. We may observe too little
litigation―so that the check on opportunistic defaults is removed―or too
much litigation―so that restructurings are disrupted by lawsuits that serve
only the interests of the bondholders pursuing the litigation. Importantly, the
incremental nature of our proposal, which allows the scope of litigation to be
adjusted through modifications to the terms of subsequent issues of bonds,
provides a process for responding to any problems that arise.345
clients in customized terms); Korobkin, supra note 340, at 1594-95 (describing the benefits to attorneys of
standardized terms).
344 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 995-97 (drawing these conclusions from an empirical analysis of
changes in the terms of sovereign debt instruments from 1995 to early 2004). But see Kahan & Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation, supra note 340, at 742, 753-56 (detecting no evidence that attorneys assisted
in the diffusion of learning benefits regarding new terms or that they promoted standardization by maintaining
the consistency of new terms in trust indentures for corporate bonds issued between November 1988 and
August 1993).
345 The relationship of the litigation remedy to the restructuring process is likely to provide the impetus
for continuing modifications. We have seen that the absence of litigation during the restructurings of the
1930s and the 1980s resulted in dramatic changes in the sovereign debt market. We can expect that not only
too little but also too much litigation will impact the current restructuring process. Moreover, because the
reforms we suggest will result in relatively minor modifications to the terms of sovereign debt instruments, we
can expect that any changes in the market for sovereign bonds will be modest.
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Third, the modifications we propose relate only to individual issues of
bonds, and so they do not provide a means of making adjustments through the
restructuring process to different issues of bonds. The modifications do,
however, provide a means of gathering information regarding more
fundamental changes in the terms of sovereign debt instruments and also the
international financial architecture. At the same time, the modifications may
serve as “small changes [that] may help lead to even larger, later changes”346
that Professor Choi and Professor Gulati identify as an important factor
facilitating changes in the sovereign debt market.
CONCLUSION
Proposals to reform the process of sovereign debt restructuring have
proliferated, largely in response to a concern that disruptive and harmful
litigation by holdout creditors threatens the viability of voluntary
restructurings. We argue, however, that holdout litigation has emerged as a
natural response to developments in the sovereign debt market, including
concerns regarding opportunistic defaults by sovereign debtors and an increase
in the heterogeneity among creditors. Judicial enforcement of sovereign debt
obligations enhances the operation of the sovereign debt market by lowering
the cost of financing to sovereign debtors and increasing the value of the
obligations to creditors.
Broad reforms that rely on majority-driven decisionmaking or an
international bankruptcy regime are premature. At the same time, they pay
insufficient attention to important differences in creditor interests. Any reform
demands a conception of intercreditor fairness that exceeds the scope of
current reform proposals. A claim of unfairness to minority creditors will
present the same threat of disrupting a proposed restructuring whether it is
presented in a court in the United States or the United Kingdom, in an
international bankruptcy court, or to an international development organization
like the IMF. More importantly, regardless of the forum, creditors will have
ample opportunity to pursue claims for strategic purposes in the hope of
obtaining a superior payment.

346

Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 934.

